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PROCEEDINGS OF THE

Thirty-Eighth Annual Meeting
Indiana State Bar Association
Held At
LAKE WAVASEE, INDIANA
JULY 12TH AND 13TH,

1934

THURSDAY MORNING
July 12, 1934
The annual meeting of the Indiana State Bar Association convened at
ten-fifteen, at the Spink-Wawasee Hotel, Lake Wawasee, Indiana, President
Eli F. Seebirt, of South Bend, presiding.
Mr. John W. Kitch, of Plymouth, extended a cordial welcome to the Association on behalf of the Second District Bar Association. The response on
behalf of the Association was made by Mr. T. Morton McDonald, Princeton.

The Secretary-Treasurer's report was given by Thomas C. Batchelor.
REPORT OF SECRETARY-TREASURER
The Treasurer was charged at the time of the last annual meeting
with the sum of --------------------------------------$ 577.55
During the year I have received the following amounts:
Dues ---------------------------------$6,000.80
Advertising, Law journal ------------------602.00
Sales of Law journal ----------------------63.82
Miscellaneous ----------------------------38.50
Total ---------------------------------

$7,282.67
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As Treasurer, I have expended the following amounts:
Law Journal expense ---------------------- $4,425.00
Secretary-Treasurer -----------------------966.00
Stationery and Postage --------------------488.18
Expense of meetings ---------------------516.39
Committee expense ------------------------229.55
Miscellaneous -----------------------------49.00
Total ---------------------------------------

$6,674.12

Less check tax ------------------------------

608.55
1.90

Leaving a balance on hand with which your
Treasurer is charged ----------------------------

$ 606.65

Vice-President Wilmer T. Fox gave the report of the Membership Committee, which on vote of the Association was received and filed.
REPORT OF MEMBERSHIP COMMITTEE
The Membership Committee submits the following report for the year
ending June 30, 1934:
Membership on June 30, 1933 -----------------------1087
New Members added at $7.00 per year------------------34
New Members added at $2.00 per year (junior) ----------- 62
Student Members added ------------------------------71
Grand Total ----------------------------------Loss by death ---------------------------13
Loss by resignation -----------------------12
Loss by transfer to Junior Membership -------- 13
Net Total ------------------------------

1254
38
1216

Against this gain of 129 members should be offset the 129 members who
are now delinquent $21.00 each. During the preceding year a total of 123
members delinquent to this extent were dropped from membership. While
the Membership Committee is not charged with the collection of delinquent
dues, the loss in membership resulting from such delinquency is chargeable
to it in the annual report, and the same financial condition that caused such
heavy delinquency also makes it difficult to secure new members.
Eliminating these 129 delinquent members so as to make the comparison
on the same basis as a year ago, the membership situation is much more
hopeful. Delinquencies in payment of dues a year ago and now are as
follows:
June 30, 1933
June 30, 1934
Members owing $7.00 ------- 307
$2,149.00
169
$1,183.00
Members owing odd amounts-3
33.00
6
60.00
Members owing $14.00 ------ 175
2,450.00
123
1,722.00
Total -----------------

485

$4,632.00

298

$2,965.00

A substantial increase in membership could be secured if the right person
would call on all prospects at the right time, but manifestly neither the
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chairman nor his twelve associates on the committee can thus cover the State
of Indiana. Invitations by mail to approximately 1900 non-members were
mailed and most of the increase in active members came in response to these
invitations. Several of the new members wrote that they had never before
been invited to join the Association.
With the return of normal times, there will undoubtedly be an increase in
membership, and efforts that seemed inadvisable this year can be put forth,
but it is respectfully submitted that the constant battle to secure new and
hold old members in a voluntary association is a waste of time that might
otherwise be put to more useful purposes. No matter how good times may
become, there will always be lawyers unwilling to contribute time or money
for the preservation and improvement of the privilege and franchise conferred upon them by the State when they were given the right to practice
their profession. An integrated bar association, of which every practicing
attorney automatically becomes a member, is the only solution. The rapidity
with which this solution is being accepted and enacted into law in this country is surprising.
The chairman has had not only the co-operation of his committee, but the
officers and directors have likewise rendered valuable assistance, for which
he takes this opportunity to express his thanks and appreciation.
Mr. Seebirt delivered the President's annual address.
PRESIDENT SEEBIRT'S ADDRESS
Precedent has mandated that the President of the Indiana State Bar Association shall, at the opening of its annual meeting, address you upon the
state of our profession, and upon the conditions of service which we are
giving and are expected to give to the State and its people.
In this 38th annual meeting we will be entertained and instructed by a
great number of eminent lawyers and judges; they will discuss with you
many specific subjects in which the legal profession should be interested, and
you will receive from them such erudition as the warm summer season will
permit you to acquire, and I therefore hope that you will approve if I confine my message to a most general report and exhortation.
First, may I express my most sincere appreciation of the honor which
you conferred upon me just one year ago. The occupancy of this office
has enabled me during the past year to form many fine friendships among
my brethren of the bar; it has enabled me to learn first hand the enduring
aspiration of great numbers of lawyers to improve the service we are giving
our clients, and as officers of the courts to bring about better conditions in
the administration of justice. I have had a most interested and unselfish
cooperation of the officers, board of managers and members of the different
committees, and I sincerely hope that each of them will understand that my
appreciation of their service in behalf of the bar of the state is here most
inadequately expressed because of my own limitation of words and time.
I am certain that there is no profession or group of business men that
are as self-accusatory as are the lawyers meeting in their bar association
conventions, they are forever discussing and laying bare before the public
their own failures, insufficiencies and shortcomings; I am aware that there
are those among us who would eliminate from our programs such discussions
and criticisms, but to my mind the best evidence of the health of the bar,
and of its right to claim continued confidence in the future, is to be found
in this habit in critically examining charges of professional abuses and failures in the operation of our legal system. Coupled with this willingness
to confess our faults there should be present in the bar a spirit of militant
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and aggressive defense of the courts and the profession whenever assailed
by the ignorant or unwise. I surrender to no man any superior claim of
devotion to my profession, but the possession of this devotion drives me at
this time to say that there are conditions existing in the profession and
attending the dispensation of justice in our courts which must give every
lawyer concern and pause.
In the last few years we have traveled far; scarcely the wisest among us
could have imagined a decade ago that such changes were possible. Changing social conditions are creating new fields of interest for the lawyer.
The powers of the legislative branch have been expanded to limits heretofore unknown; the authority exercised by the executive branch has been
enlarged almost beyond our powers of imagination, and we may rest assured
that the people of our state and nation are not going to be content with
archaic, inefficient and wrongful processes and results in the judicial department. And if the bar is not willing to give to the people a leadership in
correcting conditions, we may make up our minds that they will affect a
correction without us, and the changes made may not in many cases be consistent with the best interests and welfare of our profession. Therefore, my
principal plea to the lawyer of this state would be that he shall adopt a
broader mental attitude towards suggestions and criticisms of the public and
the press directed to a betterment in the operation of our courts and our
system of laws. The lawyer population constitutes only one person out of
each seven hundred people, and numerically the profession is not powerful
enough by itself to secure desired reforms, but because of their training and
experience in this particular department of government the lawyers of the
state do have it within their power to furnish a powerful leadership in
procuring reforms that are needed and in preventing changes hurtful to
society.
I believe there is a genuine need that the profession as a whole shall reflect
a broader recognition of its social responsibilities; that we ought to approach
with more of an open mind the suggestions pressed upon us from without
for improvement in the operation of our courts and the administration of
justice. The fact that a suggestion is new is often the very reason for its
acceptance in the business world, it ought not to be the reason for its rejection
in our profession. This effort to secure a more active interest in the entire
membership of the bar cannot be accomplished by the American Bar Association and the state bar associations alone, but we must do what we can to
create in the local bar associations an interest in the problems facing the
profession; the program of our national association known as The National
Bar Program to get every lawyer from coast to coast thinking about our
common problems and difficulties is a most worthy one and should have
our continued support; the movement must go to the very roots of the bar
and it must succeed in interesting every small association. With this in
mind I have for the second time this year invited to the meeting of our
State Association the president and other officers of all the local associations
in this State, and I am informed that many will be present; we appreciate
your presence and hope that this meeting may operate to our mutual benefit.
EDUCATION
The education of the lawyer must continue to be a matter of paramount
importance. The people of Indiana are entitled to a well trained bar; they
are entitled to an administration of the State's judicial department, functioning justly, learnedly and expeditiously. The bench is recruited from the
bar and it can scarcely arise above the standards of the bar. It is fashion-
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able nowadays to ridicule learning, but let there be no confusion because
of this popular habit, but remember that the legal profession has in all
periods of history been reputed as a learned profession; it ought to endeavor
to live up to its reputation.
There are today lawyers in Indiana, in many cases able and worthy men
and who have made themselves in the school of hard knocks, voicing objections to an increase in educational standards as conditions precedent to the
right to enter the profession; ironically enough, these same men approve of
the State demanding the most rigid requirements in medicine, engineering
and the other learned professions, but as to our own profession they are
content that there shall be poured into the stream of candidates for the bar
and the eligibles to the bench, those who have no other qualification than an
aspiration. They urge the principle of the survival of the fittest, and that
selection and elimination shall be through the grueling process of competition in practice. This democratic ideal is laudable in many ways and it
might be commendable if the operation of our courts and the practice of
the law were our own two ring circus, but it leaves out of consideration the
great fundamental fact that the members of our profession are officers of
the courts and that they are engaged in a great public service; it omits
from the problem that the lawyer is the recipient of a special privilege
from society and that it in turn is entitled to the best that the bar can
give. The injuries suffered by society from poorly prepared lawyers and
from an overcrowded profession are too well known to be dwelt upon here.
I submit that since we are officers of the court and in a measure engaged
in the operation of one of the three branches of government, that it is manifestly more important to the social order that a greater degree of care shall
be employed in the selection of the members of the legal profession than in
the case of medicine and of the other learned professions.
In th medical schools restrictions of numbers and selection of students
has been the general practice for some time, but only recently and only in
a few law schools has there been a similar selective process. In three decades
the number of medical schools in America has decreased 50 per cent. Seventy-six out of eighty are approved by the American Medical Association
and the number of students and practitioners have run practically the same.
On the other hand the number of law schools has doubled in the same time.
The majority are unapproved by the American Bar Association and the number of students has increased from 300 to 400 per cent.
It must be manifest to any one that we cannot maintain our ideals, we
cannot require the observance of ethical standards if the profession is to
continue to be deluged each year with great accessions of new lawyers far
beyond the limits of the profession to absorb and of the public to support.
We generally recognize that when any trade or calling is greatly overcrowded
that a lowering of all standards results, but we seem unable to apply this
simple rule to our own profession.
Although the last to fall in line, Indiana, in the year of 1931, made a
noteworthy advance under the Act of the General Assembly of that year
in requiring examination for admission, and both the Supreme Court and the
Board of Law Examiners are entitled to our gratitude for the way in which
this act has been applied and administered; however, this is not enough,
we must remember that Indiana is one of only six states that still have no
educational standards as conditions precedent to the right to take the examination. This association should continue to emphasize as the major part of
its program the creation, by rule of court or in some manner, of educational
standards. Upon this proposal I hope that discord may be eliminated and
that we may join unanimously upon the proposition that the State is entitled
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to the best bar that can be provideod. There is no reflection implied in this
proposal against those lawyers who came into the profession under the
privileges of the Constitution; your President is among these; but rather
it grows out of a recognition that conditions have changed and the work
required of the lawyer, his duties and obligations have become so great
and so complex that the reach thereof can hardly be conceived by the wisest
mind, and society is demanding a broader and better preparation of the
lawyer.
The bar should encourage the development in the law schools of our State
of an educational system that will be selective of the best of our youth and
that will give the most ample preparation; and we should discourage the
organization and conduct of those schools which operate only upon a commercial basis. We need only a few schools to fulfill our needs; the more
we have, the less efficient will each be to maintain the educational standards
desired. We need have no fears that by raising these standards we are
depriving aspirants of limited means of the opportunity to enter the profession; the cost of education in our law schools is so reasonable, and the
opportunities of self-help are so numerous that no really ambitious youth
will be denied the privileges of these schools.
Occasionally an effort is made by some persons to gain admission to the
practice of the law without observing the requirement of submission to an
examination; the local courts almost without exception are now denying
these applications. During the year the President of this Association appointed a Committee consisting of Messrs. Bernard Gavit, Fred C. Gause,
Frank M. Richman and Remster Bingham to resist such applications; they
successfully resisted two in the courts of Marion County, and they have
recently prepared and filed a brief opposing an original petition in the
Supreme Court which is now pending. This Association owes a debt of
gratitude to these men who have given their time to this service without
compensation.
THE REGULATION OF THE PRACTICE OF THE LAW

Perhaps the most persistent criticism of the public and press towards our
profession is that we are doing little to discipline unworthy members, but
that after the commission of infractions of laws and standards we permit
them to continue to enjoy the high privilege of membership in our profession, and to practice their frauds upon society.
After a lawyer is admitted to practice in Indiana there is absolutely no
restraint upon his conduct excepting that determined by his own conscience.
Disbarment and disciplinary proceedings are almost unknown. I do not
know of any such proceeding during the past year in any court of the State.
During this year a few lawyers have been convicted of serious crimes and
the local bar associations have done nothing to have their names as members
of the bar stricken from the rolls. A few other lawyers have committed
acts which should forfeit their right to membership; but they remain in
the profession. This is not because the bar of this State is indifferent to
these matters, but rather it grows out of the fact that under the present
law the filing of such a proceeding is largely futile; the trial of the issue
may be had before a jury. In such jury trials the proceedings are long
drawn out, expensive and almost always abortive. Indiana is one of only two
states that permits such a hearing to be by jury. While these conditions
obtain in Indiana we observe the bars of our sister states where the power
to discipline is vested in the Supreme Court, active and alert in assisting the
court in the exercise of a wholesome restraint upon the profession. An
object of the first importance of the bar of Indiana should be the matter of
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placing in the Supreme Court of this State full and complete jurisdiction
over all matters regarding disbarment or suspension of attorneys. The
proceeding involves the alleged transgression of ethical standards and professional duties susceptible of understanding only by a court, and therefore
they should be heard by the court without a jury. It is an anomalous condition that the Court which has the power to fix the coiditions of obtaining
membership in the bar and becoming officers of the Court has no power to
determine who shall continue to be members of the bar and its officers; in
admitting to the bar the Supreme Court is granting a privilege only, and it
ought to possess the power to withdraw the privilege for abuse thereof.
Perhaps answer will be made to this statement concerning the lack of effort
in Indiana to discipline the profession by pointing out that the Indiana State
Bar Association has a Grievance Committee and that its Constitution provides for the investigation of charges against both members of our association and lawyers who are not members. This is true, and each year the
Grievance Committee of this association does a very large amount of work
and succeeds in correcting a great many complaints by correspondence and
by hearings before the Committee. But our Grievance Committee cannot
compel persons to appear before it, there is no power vested by law in the
association or its Committee to file proceedings against an offending member
of the bar, and if the association undertook such action voluntarily, its effort
would be accompanied by the same difficulties pointed out and by the additional one that such action in the local courts would be resented as an obtrusion of the State Association into local situations, and the whole effort would
result in futility. Until there is some change in the law the work of the
Grievance Committee should be limited to cleansing the roll of its own membership and of declaring general policies, and the work of disciplining should
be handled by the local associations.
The ineffective provisions in our Constitution providing for the filing of
charges before its Committee and the investigation thereof and the reporting
of its findings to the annual meetings are used by the local bar associations
As an escape from their own responsibilities. The investigation and hearing
of charges against members of the profession is a very unpleasant duty
and our inclination is to avoid the experience. Complaints against members
of the profession are usually lodged in the first instance with the officers of
the local associations in the communities where the charges arise, and it
happens more often than not that they, instead of accepting a plain responsibility and making an investigation of the charge lodged, refer the complainant to the Grievance Committee of the State Bar Association, and then
assume toward him the attitude of responsibility fully discharged. My belief
is that if anything can be accomplished in the matter of discipline under our
present law, it must necessarily come from the effort of lawyers in the local
communities where the alleged offense is committed and usually where the
lawyer under charge resides. This whole regrettable situation can easily be
corrected by the repeal of the statute upon the subject of disbarment and
suspension and the placing of complete power in the Supreme Court to adopt
rules and regulations upon the subject; this action should not abide the time
of the adoption of a State Bar Act. This is a matter of vital importance
to the practicing lawyers of Indiana. We cannot maintain that esteem of
the public which we desire so much if we continue to pass unnoticed the
impositions of lawyers upon their clients and the public. We must place
the bar of Indiana squarely behind the leadership of the present Attorney
General of the United States who in several addresses recently made has
proclaimed that there must be a housecleaning of the bar by the bar. The
responsibility in this matter is wholly ours; we cannot place it elsewhere.
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LOCAL COURTS AND THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL

State Bar Associations are accustomed to give much of the time on their
programs to a discussion of the problems of and the conditions in the
reviewing courts, forgetful of the fact that much less than one per cent of
the cases filed in the trial courts are appealed. Therefore, I feel, that we
should reverse this rule, and give a very much more important place on
our programs to the work of the trial courts. Believing this, we are at this
meeting devoting one entire session to the subject of the conditibns and
problems of the trial courts; we have invited to this meeting all the judges
of the Circuit and Superior Courts of the State; they met last January at
the mid-winter meeting and formed an organization for the improvement
of their work. And it is my hope that the meeting of these judges as a
section may have a permanent place on our programs. Every lawyer who
is accustomed to appearing in different trial courts is impressed with their
dissimilar methods and technique of operation; he has observed the efficient
and effective operation of some, and the inept and indifferent operation of
others. I am convinced that great good may be had from a discussion of the
problems of the trial courts, and from an exchange of ideas by the trial
judges. I am also hopeful that their association together as a voluntary
judicial council may lead to the enactment of a statute providing for such a
Judicial Council as is had by many of our sister states.
I am also convinced that capable and conscientious judges everywhere are
almost unanimously hopeful that the time may soon come when there shall
be in use a more expert and responsible method of selecting judges than now
exists. If there is any human activity that should be removed from the
touch and influence of politics, certainly that activity is the judging process,
and it is encouraging to note a growing interest in better ways of selection.
It is an omen of good for the people of Indiana that its judges are willing
to sit down together to consider some of these suggestions for the improvement of their public service.
UNREASONABLE DELAYS IN OPERATION OF COURTS

Another most insistent criticism of our court system relates to the long
delays in the trial and decision of causes.
Modern business has been geared to a high degree of speed; it has enthroned service as its king; its spirit is expressed in almost every business
appeal. In the last generation the American people have been trained to
expect service; and if the law office and the court is unable to give the
service demanded, we may expect society to turn elsewhere for relief;
it will create further administrative boards, will turn to arbitration, or
disputants will even forego rights and will accept unfair and unjust compromises and settlements to avoid the sluggish processes of the courts. Delays in the functioning of the machinery of the law is costing the people
a staggering amount in economic and social values, and of course it cannot
be stated what the cost is in dollars to the members of our profession, but
the actual loss in money is a tremendous one. Unreasonable delays in the
trial and decision of causes is driving the business men from the law offices.
We are mainly responsible for these delays, and we are paying an enormous
price for their enjoyment.
Most of the blame for delays in the trial courts can be placed squarely
upon the lawyers; and some of the responsibility belongs to them for unreasonable delays in the courts of review. There are unnecessary appeals,
briefs are too long, and too much time is taken in appeals. The vacation
appeal taken in 180 days after judgment should be abolished. I am glad to

STATE BAR ASSOCIATION PROCEEDINGS

say that notwithstanding a large accumulation of business the present Supreme Court has with great industry undertaken to give relief, and bring
the decision of cases down to date; it is making progress and is entitled to
our commendation and confidence.
UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF THE LAW

At the LaFayette meeting of this Association in 1931 there was presented
for the first time an appeal to stop the unlawful practice of the law. I recall
a very decided spirit of opposition to that appeal; the usual argument was
employed that since lawyers were not giving that financially reasonable
service demanded by the public that it had the right to use the banks and
trust companies as its legal clearing house. During the three years since
the sounding of that alarm there has been revealed such a debacle of betrayals of sacred fiduciary obligations by banks and trust companies as has
even convinced the public that in legal matters there is no substitute to
the dependable and well trained lawyer who gives to his client a singleness
of interest in his service, and who discharges his duty under the obligations
of those ethical and professional principles evolved through the ages.
But this abuse is not entirely stopped, and we must be diligent that it shall
be entirely stamped out, and in the future to see that it shall not again grow
insidiously upon us.
The unauthorized practice of the law would almost entirely cease, if it
were not for the participation therein by members of the bar. The schemes
of trust companies, credit and collection corporations to engage in the practice of the law have been constructed by members of our profession; the
fault is that of our profession in allowing our members to accept employment to further such practices; it is well settled that a member of the bar
who assists a corporation in the illegal practice of the law is subject to
discipline, and when this power is exercised the practice will cease entirely.
It is in the public interest that we protect the public from the evil effects
thereof.
FINANCIAL CONDITION OF ASSOCIATION

Today for the first time in many years this Association finds itself practically out of debt. Only four years ago its indebtedness exceeded five
thousand dollars. Since then our Secretary-Treasurer has applied himself
to the task of giving an attentive and business-like administration to the
financial affairs of the Association, and during a period of the most difficult
business conditions has realized this result. If every account and debt were
paid, the Association would owe less than $300.00; and there is many times
this amount due from advertising in the Journal and from dues of members.
During these same years of business depression we have been able to maintain about the same level of membership in the Association. At the midwinter meeting at Indianapolis an amendment to the Constitution was adopted
making it possible for young lawyers and law students to become members
for a small fee; many have availed themselves of this opportunity. The
Association will profit greatly from this amendment as it is of the greatest
importance that we shall bring to its service the enthusiasm and idealism of
the young lawyers coming into the profession.
Occasionally there is some complaint about bar association dues being
excessive. However, the facts are that lawyers in Indiana can belong to
the American Bar Association, the State Bar Association and the Local Bar
Association for a total expense ranging from $15.00 to $25.00 per year.
The total cost of membership in all of these associations is less than what
many spend for an athletic contest or for a day or two of vacation; it is so
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reasonable that all their privileges should be enjoyed by every lawyer in the
state. It might be noted here that the annual license fee alone to the State
of Indiana paid by members of certain other professions is the sum of
$25.00. This Association should not reduce its membership fees any further. The revenue is greatly needed so that it may take upon itself an
additional service to its members. The Bar Journal is an excellent publication but it does not contain all that its editors desire for the reason that
the Association was required to retrench because of the debts referred to.
Also, the Association from time to time has desired to perform other services
to its members which should be undertaken.
In conclusion, I picture as the objectives of the Indiana State Bar Association, the co-ordination of the lawyers of the State into a more harmonious and sympathetic body, a better trained bar, an experienced and able
judiciary freed from the hazards of political tenure, a more prompt dispatch
of business, and the creation of conditions in the practice that will enable
the profession fully to attain and enjoy the high place in our social order
to which it is entitled, that of being the noblest profession of them all.
Mr. Glenn D. Peters, of Hammond, delivered the report of the Committee
on Illegal Practice of the Law.
REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON UNAUTHORIZED
PRACTICE OF THE LAW
The undersigned, your Committee appointed and designated as the Committee on the Unauthorized Practice of Law, begs leave to submit for the
consideration of the Association the following report:
Your Committee is happy to say that no serious complaint has been
made to it concerning any action on the part of unauthorized persons in
connection with the practice of law. Several complaints involving minor
infractions have been made, and in every instance either the persons committing an unauthorized act have ceased voluntarily upon being reminded that
they were engaged in an unlawful practice, or ceased to exist before the
attention of your Committee was called to such matters.
Your Committee, however, wishes to remind the profession that it is an
unlawful act-for an unauthorized person to engage in the practice of law;
that it is the obligation of the profession to the public to see to it that only
authorized persons engage in the profession and that claimed violations of
the rule against unauthorized persons practicing law should be reported to
the Committee for investigation and action.
Mr. Fred C. Gause of Indianapolis delivered the report of the Committee on Legislation, which by vote of the Association was referred to the
Board of Managers for further action.

REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON LEGISLATION
Your Committee on Legislation submits the following report:
Since the appointment of this Committee there has been no session of
the General Assembly of our State and, therefore, your Committee is necessarily confined, in this report, to a general statement of the outlook for
securing favorable legislative action on measures advocated by the Association.
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We understand that the Association is on record as advocating
(1) A bill expressly vesting in the Supreme Court the power to prescribe all rules and regulations relating to practice and procedure.
(2) A bill creating a Judicial Council, and
(3) A bill providing for an integrated bar.
We further understand there is to be submitted to the Association a
report of a committee suggesting certain changes in the Criminal Code.
It is not within the province of our Committee to recommend what action
the Association should take on any proposal, but it rather is its function to
attempt to get legislative approval of any bills advocated by the Association.
However, without attempting to pass upon the merits of any proposed
legislation, this Committee is of the opinion that the Association may well
consider the following suggestions:
The legislative program of the Association should be confined to those
measures which it deems most important at the present time and about which
there is the least controversy.
It occurs to this Committee that the salient features of the bill vesting in
the Supreme Court the power to prescribe the rules regulating practice and
procedure and the one creating a Judicial Council, might all be combined in
one bill.
The bill which has heretofore been approved by the Association, giving to
the Supreme Court the power to regulate practice and procedure, provides
that the present statutes and rules shall remain in effect until changed by
the Supreme Court.
One of the main functions of a Judicial Council would be to recommend
changes in the practice and procedure of our courts.
Could not the bill authorizing the Supreme Court to prescribe rules of
practice and procedure, also create a judicial council to make recommendations to the Supreme Court as to such matters, reserving to the Court,
however, the final decisions thereon?
We apprehend that many of the proposals made or to be made by the
Committee on Revision of the Criminal Code, could be accomplished by rule
of the Supreme Court, if the right of that court to make all such rules is
expressly recognized by the General Assembly.
It would, therefore, appear as if one bill could embody much of the program of the Association.
As to the Integrated Bar Bill, about which there has been considerable
controversy, we would call the attention of the Association to the trend
of courts of last resort in other states in holding that Supreme Courts have
inherent power over adrmissions and the suspension or disbarment of attorneys and that while the legislature may regulate such power, it can not
destroy it.
If our Court should take the view recently expressed by other Supreme
Courts, such as Illinois and Missouri, much that was sought to be accomplished by the Integrated Bar Bill could be accomplished without it, simply
by the Court exercising such inherent power, if it is decided that such power
exists.
Since the question of regulating the practice of law is clearly related to
questions of practice and procedure, and they all relate to one general subj ect, it is apparent that a bill giving to the Supreme Court the power to
prescribe rules of practice and procedure and creating a council to recommend changes therein, could, under an appropriate title, also regulate the
subject of admissions to the bar and the disciplining of attorneys by the
Supreme Court, if it should be thought advisable to have any legislative
enactment upon this latter subject.
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It would, therefore, appear to be desirable for the Association, through
its Board of Governors, or the proper committee, to give consideration to
the question as to whether one bill might not be devised that, if enacted,
would achieve most of the results contemplated by our legislative program.
We are led to make the foregoing suggestions because of our belief that
the Association should restrict its legislative efforts to as few proposals as
possible consistent with its objectives and avoid those proposals about which
there is the most controversy.

Mr. George 0. Dix of Terre Haute read the report of the Committee on
Jurisprudence and Law Reform, which by vote of the Association was
referred to the Board of Managers for action.
REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON JURISPRUDENCE
AND LAW REFORM
Your Committee on Jurisprudence and Law Reform has heretofore
recommended and the Association has approved:
1. A bill creating a Judicial Council.
2. A bill vesting in the State Supreme Court the power to make all rules
of procedure.
Both bills were introduced in the 1933 session of the General Assembly,
and although both received favorable committee reports, they were subsequently defeated on the floor.
We believe that the passage of these two bills would be an important step
forward in the State's jurisprudence, and we recommend that the Association cause them to be re-introduced in the 1935 General Assembly.
Your Committee has, during the year, considered several proposed bills,
all pertaining to some phase of procedure. The matters covered by these
bills would all be subject to such rules of procedure as the Supreme Court
might adopt under the Procedure Bill, if passed. The proponents of these
bills argue that the Association should not confine its efforts, on procedural
matters, to the general procedure bill above referred to, but should lend its
influence toward the passage of the suggested bills, each dealing with some
certain phase of procedure.
After due consideration, your Committee considers that it would be unwise
to attempt to patch up our present laws on procedure by the passage of
additional separate and unrelated acts, but that the efforts and influence of
the Association should be concentrated upon the two bills above referred to,
which have already been approved by the Association.
More than half of the states of the Union now have Judicial Councils,
and many of the states have adopted laws vesting in their Supreme Courts
the power to make rules of procedure. In other states the Supreme Courts,
without legislative action, have assumed or re-assumed the power to make
rules of procedure, upon the theory that such power has always been vested
in the Court and that the previous exercise of the power by the legislature
has been usurpation.
The Congress in its closing days passed the bill which has been before it
for many years, vesting in the United States Supreme Court the power to
lay down uniform rules of procedure for all Federal courts. In signing
the bill, President Roosevelt is reported to have pronounced it a most important and desirable link in the movement to make all legal procedure, both
state and federal, more uniform and simple.
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The Judicial Council and Procedure Bills, sponsored by this Association,
are companion bills and should be passed and put into operation together.
We recommend that the Association concentrate its efforts on the passage
of these two bills.
THURSDAY AFTERNOON
July 12, 1934
The session convened at 2:20, President Seebirt in the chair. President
Seebirt introduced the Honorable Henry S. Caulfield, ex-Governor of Missouri, and member of the Vissouri Court of Appeals and chairman of the
commission appointed by the Supreme Court of Missouri to investigate and
report upon the Regulation of the Practice of the Law. Mr. Caulfield read
to the Association a prepared paper.
REGULATION OF THE PRACTICE OF LAW
I have come from Missouri to talk to you about the regulation of the
practice of the law. There is, at the present hour, grave reason why lawyers
should give this subject special attention, with a view to making the administration of justice more efficient.
The judicial system, with its courts and its lawyers, is a part of the people's
government.
There is, today, particularly in Europe, a distinct tendency away from
government by the people, and toward autocracy. The excuse is that an
uncontrolled executive can best meet the exigencies of the present time.
America is not entirely free from danger in this respect. It may, at least,
be fairly said, that the American people are viewing with considerable complacency, an apparent drift away from the ancient moorings of constitutional government.
The thing that has so far sustained America's government is the faith of
the people that they can govern best. If government by the people, according to American traditions, is to endure, the people must not lose that faith.
It will be lost if the people see their attempts to govern rendered futile by
inefficient agencies.
Mr. Justice Atwood, of the Missouri Supreme Court, in his speech before
the Kansas City Bar Association, has well said:
"Today, perhaps as never before, our very form of government is on
trial in the eyes of millions of our citizens as well as before the family of
nations. When we see the reign of law in other lands giving way to the
rule of might and the light of experience fails along paths we are forced to
tread, well may the members of our bench and bar consider in season and
out of season and press to solution problems affected with a public interest
which are primarily our own."
The Judicial Department of government is not free from the widespread
dissatisfaction with government by the people. In his annual address,
delivered October 12, 1932, President" Guy A. Thompson of the American
Bar Association said:
"The layman's indictment of the bar is in three counts: and the indorsements of many witnesses appear upon the bill; the first count charges that
justice and the law are uncertain; the second, tlwt the bar is slothful in

ridding the profession of unscrupulous mzembers; the third, that the legal
profession does nothing to improve the administration of justice."
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These are not my charges, nor do I endorse them, so far as they would
blame the lawyers, as a class, for the conditions described.
Indeed, the administration of justice has made marked progress and
achieved vast improvement, compared to the other branches of government,
and this is largely due to the earnest endeavors of the lawyers, banded
together in their bar associations.
The task of providing machinery for regulating the practice of the law
is essentially governmental. It can be performed only by the Legislative
or the Judicial departments of government; only by the legislators or the
Judges, as such, not by lawyers, as such, either individually or as a class.
What the lawyers can do is to formulate plans for the regulation of the
practice, and to strive to have the governmental authorities put them in
force. They can-actively co-operate to make them successful after they are
put in force. The lawyers are particularly qualified by their training to do
this. It is of special interest and benefit to them. It is a service they owe
to the people; and the people look to them to perform it.
The lawyers have accepted the task. For years they have been organizing
throughout the nation. Their bar associations have struggled with legislatures and with the courts for the setting up of adequate machinery for the
purpose of raising the standards of the legal profession.
The lawyers, in their struggles for higher qualifications, and for the purging of the bar, have had no more power than private citizens, and no money
except their own private funds. Only a passionate devotion to splendid
ideals could have sustained them through these long years of often frustrated
efforts.
Nevertheless, they have fought a good fight, with ever increasing victories,
and now their effort is nationwide in its scope.
You in Indiana have achieved amazingly favorable results under tremendous difculties.
There are men here, engaged in this work, who are far more able than I
am to discuss the subject assigned to me. I would not have had the courage
to appear before you in this capacity, indeed, I would not have been invited,
were it not that I come fresh from a field of battle, with news of another
victory.
For twenty years the machinery in Missouri for purging the profession
has been hampered by the decision of the 'Supreme Court in Selleck v.
Reynolds, 252 Mo. 369, 158 S. W. 671. There the court held that, in so
far as the statutes governing disbarment were reasonable, the courts were
bound by them. The statutes, held to be reasonable, provided that if the
disbarment was to be based upon charges amounting to indictable offences,
the facts must be determined by a jury in a criminal proceeding, the disbarment court to be bound by an acquittal. Thus the type of lawyer permitted
to practice before our courts was to be determined by juries-at least where
the lawyers were charged with indictable offences. But the day of our
deliverance came. In a recent case (In re Richards, 63 S. W. (2d) 672),
a lawyer had been charged with being involved in a kidnapping, an indictable
offense. He was acquitted by a jury. Nevertheless, the bar associations
of Missouri ought his disbarment. Our Supreme Court rendered its judgment of disbarment, declaring itself. possessed of the inherent power to
disbar, independent of the legislature. The Court placed the judiciary on
the high ground of an independent department of government, vested by
the Constitution with the inherent right to accomplish all objects naturally
within its orbit, and it declared that a primary object, essentially within the
orbit of the judicial department, is that courts properly function in the
administration of justice, for which purpose they were created, and that
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they cannot long continue to do this without power to admit and disbar
attorneys. The Court characterized the ruling in the Selleck case as a
"judicial aberation," saying that disbarment is not a criminal proceeding;
that its purpose is not to punish but to ascertain and drive out the unfit;
and that any statutory enactment undertaking to make an acquittal in a
criminal prosecution a bar to such an investigation, would be an unconstitutional encroachment of the legislative upon the judicial department of
government.
The Missouri Bar Association had been active for several years in urging
upon the legislature the elevation of standards, the creation of a definite
code of ethics, and more effective methods of disciplining attorneys guilty
of unethical conduct. But their efforts had failed. Their most recent
failure to obtain legislative aid was with regard to an Incorporated Bar Bill.
The decision in the Richards case revived their drooping spirits. They
believed that its effect was to place the Court's power of regulation above
any legislative acts designed to limit or control it. They saw in the decision
an opportunity, which they grasped.
At their request, our high Court assumed the leadership, and appointed
a commission, of which I had the honor to be named the chairman, to make
a thorough investigation and study of the subject of regulation of the practice of law, particularly with a view to ascertaining its most practical and
effective scope and administration in Missouri, and to make a report with
recommendations to the Court. The members of the commission immediately went to work. They made no expensive surveys; they sent out no
questionnaires. They proceeded on the theory that they knew of the evils
to be remedied and that it was their job to recommend to the Court machinery
for overcoming them. In a very short time they made their report and
recommendations. The Court unanimously adopted them. (At this point in
his address, Mr. Caulfield received and read the following telegram.)
St. Louis, Mo., July 12, 1934.
Hon. Henry S. Caulfield,
Hotel Spink Wawasee,
Wawasee, Ind.
Supreme Court yesterday formally incorporated commission's report into
its rules, effective November 1, 1934, instead January. Corrections address
delivered 0. K.
A. H.

JENNINGS.

By this action the Supreme Court of Missouri has raised the standards
for admission to the bar to an eminently satisfactory extent. But, as President Jesse Barrett of the Missouri State Bar Association said in a recent
editorial: "More important than the standards prescribed, is the fact that
henceforth those standards will be fixed by that department of government
which best understands what is needed, and is most concerned therewith.
This power, in Missouri, is at last lodged with its proper custodian. The
Court has adopted the Canon of Ethics of the American Bar Association as
the measure of conduct and responsibility of the lawyers of Missouri. Thus
the subject of ethics has passed from the hazy field of new years' resolutions
into definite rules of law."
Having laid down the rules of conduct, the Court further establishes, for
their enforcement and for disciplining of lawyers, in each Judicial Circuit,
a Bar Committee to be composed of four lawyers, to be appointed by the
Supreme Court. There will be thirty-eight of such Bar Committees, covering the entire State. Upon them will devolve the duties heretofore exercised
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voluntarily by the Grievance Committees of the Bar Associations, but with
power to do something. In making their investigations, they will have
power to cause witnesses to be summoned and sworn. They are authorized
and directed to file disbarment proceedings in Court and to act as prosecutors
therein. In short, the Bar Association Grievance Committees with their
inadequate powers and inadequate funds, are supplanted by thirty-eight
Grievance Committees adequately financed and with sufficient powers, and
back of them stands the power and the authority of Missouri's High Court.
The rules further contemplate that these Bar Committees shall be vigilant
to suppress the unlawful practice of law by persons not licensed to do so.
Perhaps the most far-reaching feature of the plan, the most daring, is the
levying of an annual enrollment fee on each lawyer in the State for the
purpose of meeting the expenses of the disciplinary machinery set up by
the Court.
The new plan further contemplates the creation of a permanent commission to be known as the Judicial Council of Missouri, the duty of which
will be to make a continuous study of the rules of practice and procedure,
and to survey the condition of the business of the courts, with a view to
simplifying and improving the administration of justice.
Thus we feel that Missouri has taken her place in the front rank of the
states working toward a better administration of justice in America. We
realize that much remains to be done. We did not go as far as we might
have gone. But, we have won a battle, and the war is not over. We go
forward with a higher spirit than the lawyers of my State have had for
generations.
The burden of raising the standards for admission and of purging the
profession of the unfit, has long rested upon the members of the bar. They
have had no lawful powers; they could only importune the legislature, and
prosecute disbarment proceedings as private citizens. They have had great
difficulty in getting anything adequate or workable out of the legislatures;
and the courts, in disciplinary matters assumed a judicial attitude, ready to
act as umpire between public spirited lawyers and the accused, as if the
proceeding were merely another lawsuit. No provision was made by law
for investigating complaints against lawyers, preliminary to filing suit for
disbarment. Grievance Committees made investigations the best they could,
without authority to summon or swear witnesses, and without public funds
to meet the expense. Indeed, it has not been uncommon for the prosecutors,
actuated by the highest motives, to go from the court room like culprits,
with heavy bills for costs tacked on to them. In the Richards case the
Grievance Committees were compelled, by court order, to deposit $750.00
to cover the costs of a hearing by a special commissioner before the cause
could progress.
Such a system would have been wholly ineffective, were it not that right
thinking lawyers banded themselves into voluntary bar associations and took
upon themselves the labor and expense and largely the responsibility for
keeping clean the fountain of justice.
Even with their efforts the system has failed to stem a tide of commercialism, and worse, which threatens the legal profession.
The practical failure of the old system, or lack of system, and the very
real danger confronting the legal profession have caused the lawyers to
engage in a movement which has grown and developed until now it is nationwide. It has become more and more apparent to them that the regulation
of law practice should be gotten away from the legislature and into their
control. By common consent and public opinion they have already been
burdened with the responsibility for the good conduct of lawyers, and they
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feel that they should be vested with sufficient power and have placed at
their disposal the necessary funds. In many states, at the insistence of the
lawyers, the legislatures have surrendered the whole matter to them by
either incorporating the bar, or recognizing it as a body politic, compulsorily
including all lawyers as members, with the obligation to pay dues, and providing for a governing board, to be selected by the entire bar, and giving
that board power to promulgate rules, administer discipline and determine
the matter of admission.
In other states, the legislatures have broadly authorized the courts to
handle the whole matter by rule.
In three, the courts have taken action, independently of the legislature.
In many states, including Missouri, the legislatures would do nothing
worth while.
The lawyers have quite uniformly sought action by the legislature for this
purpose, probably because in most states the legislative was the only department of government that assumed to act. From time immemorial the courts
had declared that they were possessed of an inherent power to govern the
admission and discipline of attorneys; nevertheless, most of them passively
acquiesced in the encroachments by the legislatures.
But the seriousness of the situation, particularly where legislatures have
failed to act, and probably the prodding of an aroused and united bar, has
caused the courts to realize that the responsibility for the administration of
justice rests primarily upon them, and that this matter of the kind of lawyers
practicing before them is vital to the very life of the judicial department of
government.
The courts are becoming increasingly aware not only that the duty rests
upon them, but also that they have the necessary power. It is pertinent
then to inquire whether the legislative or the judicial department of government is the proper one to fashion and establish the machinery for regulating
the practice of law. Probably my opinion is influenced by the attitude of
Missouri's Supreme Court, but I am convinced that the legislature is acting
wholly without its jurisdiction when it undertakes to say who shall be
entitled to practice before the courts of the state. The very difficulty of
inducing action by the legislatures, and that difficulty has been very great,
only serves to emphasize how little the subject, which is vital to the very
life of the courts, is of interest to the legislative department of the government. Surrendering the whole function to the lawyers, as such, is gratifying
to their vanity and is certainly of more practical utility than for the legislatures to go on as they have done. But when we consider the judiciary as
a great and dignified department of government, of equal dignity with the
legislative department, it presents something of the incongruous that the
legislative department should set up an official body, even of lawyers, to
determine who should be permitted to practice law before the courts. The
blow is softened by reserving to the courts the final say, but that does not
alter the character of the offense. Both the power and the responsibility
belong with the Judicial department. This is widely if not universally
recognized.
Professor Costigan, in his recent book upon "The Legal Profession and
Its Ethics," says (page 162):
"The control of the judiciary over the matter (the admission and discipline of members of the bar) has been an outcome of the separation of
the powers of government under our constitution into executive, legislative
and judicial, and to an increasing awareness by the courts, and their growing
insistence, that the admission and discipline of members of the legal pro-
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fession is essentially a judiciary power free from any interference by the
legislature which the courts do not'find helpful and voluntarily accept."
And this control carries with it everything incidental to its accomplishment,
even the integration of the bar, with all that that implies. As was said in the
Richards case, "it is a fundamental principle of constitutional law that each
department of government, whether federal or state, has, without any
express grant, the inherent right to accomplish all objects naturally within
the orbit of that department."
Whether a particular act is legislative or judicial in its character does not
necessarily determine whether it is within the province of the legislative or
the judicial department.
In determining whether a given act is within the province of the executive, legislative or judicial department, we must look not to the character
of the act alone but to its scope and particular function in the scheme of
which it is a part. For instance, when the House of Representatives determines a contest over a seat, it does an act judicial in character but having
no relation to any part of the general scheme of government except as to
the membership of that house and is an "act naturally within the orbit of
that department."
When the Court prescribes that briefs shall be in a certain form and
printed, it does an act legislative in character, but having relation to no
matters except causes before the Court, an act "naturally within the orbit"
of the Judicial Department. Other analogies might be made but these will
suffice to illustrate the point that it is the function and scope or purpose of
the act that determines to which department of government it belongs, rather
than the character of the act.
With this distinction in view the courts may adopt rules which, while
legislative in character, are within the proper exercise of the judicial powers,
because they have for their object the better regulation of the practice of law
and better standards for the legal profession, subjects which are within the
orbit of the Judicial Department.
President Robert Guinther of the Ohio State Bar Association, in his
splendid address on "The Integration of the Bar Through Judicial Order,"
on July 7, 1933, stated the thought more concretely, thus:
"It is apparent, thus, that the courts of Ohio and elsewhere, properly
assert their power over the two highly essential elements of a lawyer's life;
his admission to practice, and his right to continue to practice. Power over
these two elements is power over the whole of the life and living of the
lawyer. It includes, of necessity, the power to determine proprieties of
practice; to regulate the conduct of attorneys; to punish, as a contempt,
persons not admitted to the bar, who attempt to usurp, unlawfully, the
function or office of an attorney. It includes the power to determine what
constitutes the practice of law, and to deny to usurpers the right to continue
in doing those things which constitute the practice of law. It includes the
power to forbid those not admitted to the bar to perform acts and functions
which are genuinely the practice of law, even though a legislative act may
have pretended to confer on them the right to perform the acts."
The question of the desirability of the integration of the bar is one far
afield from my subject. I quote from President Guinther's address merely
for the purpose of stressing that the power of the Judicial Department is
broad enough to encompass every incidental means reasonably calculated to
achieve the broad objective, improvement of the administration of justice.
I do not question the right of the legislature, in the exercise of its police
power, to make rules for the admission and discipline of lawyers, or other-
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wise governing the practice of the law, but these legislative acts must be
regarded as subject to the authority of the courts to supplement them where
insufficient, and to displace them when they interfere with or curtail the
powers of the courts, in the matter of administering justice.
As was said by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in In re: Opinion of
Justices, 180 N. E. 725, when that Court was considering an act regulating
admission to the bar:
"No statute can control the judicial department in the performance of its
duty to decide who shall enjoy the privilege of practicing law. Statutes
(prescribing qualifications for admission) are valid provided they do not
infringe on the right of the judicial department to determine who shall
exercise the privilege of practicing. When, and so far as statutes specify
qualifications and accomplishments, they will be regarded as fixing a minimum, and not as setting bounds beyond which the judicial department can
not go."
Nor do I contend that the judicial way may be appropriate to the utmost
extent in every state. The constitution of each state must be studied, and
considered in determining the question. Thus, in Missouri, while our commission felt that the Supreme Court had blazed a wide trail for judicial
regulation of the practice of the law, we did not feel justified in asking it
to prescribe the rules of practice and procedure. We concluded that under
the decisions of Missouri "the power to prescribe rules of practice and
procedure is a legislative power; that while the courts have inherent power
to make rules of procedure, such power is subordinate to the legislative
power and no rule of court relating to procedure can stand against a statute
on the same subject."
I do not come to you with the hope that I may suggest a wholly satisfactory plan for regulating the practice. We can but give each other the
benefit of such thoughts as may occur to us. We may but strive, with all
our might, for the advancement of the great profession we honor and
revere. What is the proper method of regulating the practice of the law is
a question which requires careful consideration. Each state will try the
method of its own choosing. But the merit of any method will depend upon
the spirit and measure of co-operation of the lawyers who will work under
it. No scheme of regulation, however adroitly fashioned, can be of value,
unless it is an expression of the soul and purpose of the group whom it
will regulate. The best regulation is self-regulation.
The report of the Supreme Court of Indiana was delivered by Chief
Justice James P. Hughes.
REPORT ON THE WORK OF THE SUPREME COURT
Mr. President, Members of the State Bar Association: As your President
has said, it has been the custom for either the Chief Justice or some member
of the Supreme Court to make a report to the State Bar Association at its
annual meeting, and I am here at this time for that purpose.
I believe that our President in his letters suggested that it would be proper
to discuss some of the outstanding cases, if there be any, decided by the
Court during the past year. I called this to the attention of the members
of the Court, while in conference one day, and I realized at once that it
would never do for me to even attempt to indicate what cases might be
considered the leading and outstanding ones. When the suggestion was
presented each Judge was on his feet suggesting that certain cases were the
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outstanding ones. I immediately saw that each Judge had in view his own
work, and in order to keep peace in Court, I abandoned the idea and concluded I would make the ordinary report as to what the Court has done
since July 1, 1933, to July 1, 1934.
I wish first to report that the members of the Court are working in harmony and giving the best that is within us to our work. I do not mean by
"working in harmony" that we do not have any different opinions as to
what result should be reached in any given case. Far from this. We do
disagree on many occasions and fight for our contentions. This, however,
is done in a friendly way in attempting to reach a correct conclusion in a
given case. By reason of the fine spirit among us, we feel that we have
been able to dispose of more work than we could have otherwise accomplished.
From July 1, 1933, to July 1, 1934, we have written 131 opinions and in
addition several dissenting opinions. Many .of these cases involved new
questions of law growing out of the Acts of 1933 Session of the Legislature, and required a great deal of time and consideration. We have passed
upon 81 transfers from the Appellate Court. Sixty-six of these were denied
and 15 were granted and opinions written. Five opinions were written in
cases from the Appellate Court where four Judges did not agree.
I am glad to report that we are up, at the present time, on transfers.
There are a few that have been taken over, but no opinion yet written. From
now on we will be able to handle all transfers as soon as the petitions are
filed and briefed.
As has been heretofore reported, the transfers have taken up much of the
time of the Supreme Court. Some of the lawyers seem to think that it is
a mere formal matter in disposing of a transfer and should only take a few
minutes of the time of the Court. This is not true. In most cases the
transfers are thoroughly briefed and it is the conscientious duty of the
Judge to thoroughly read and study the briefs. It would certainly be unfair
to the lawyers and litigants who have spent days in the preparation of their
briefs for a member of the Court to refuse to study them. Many of the
transfers take hours of work in the individual Judge's office, and then when
it is presented in conference it may, and often does, take several hours more
for the Court to come to an agreement. If the transfer is granted it then
takes the time of one Judge to write the opinion. I think it is safe to say
about one-third of our time is taken with this work. Many of these transfers
involve difficult questions and are for the Court to consider.
I remember one in particular where a great deal of time was spent in the
office on this transfer. It involved some very close and difficult questions,
and then when it was presented to the whole court, it also required a long
while before we cotjld come to the conclusion as to whether or not to take
that particular case over.
We feel that there will not be so many transfers hereafter, due to two
reasons. In the first place the payment of $50, as is now required by law,
will prevent some petitions being filed. I am not passing on the merits of
this law, but this is surely its tendency. In the second place, the fact that
a transfer can be acted upon immediately will have a tendency to prevent
petitions being filed, and especially those that were merely filed for delay.
I might further say that, of course, the transfers that the Supreme Court
has handled for the past year and a half, many of them have been there a
long while. Those old cases are now all disposed of, and as the new cases
will be taken up immediately now upon being briefed, of course, that is
going to give members of the Supreme Court considerable more time to
work on their own cases in the Supreme Court.
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In addition to the foregoing work, we have heard 50 oral arguments and
passed upon at least 80 petitions for rehearing. We have had 18 original
actions filed and passed upon and some of these took considerable time of
the Court. We considered 25 other original actions that were never filed.
These took the same amount of time and work as those that were filed.
I might say upon that proposition that it is the practice of the court that
when a petition in an original action is presented, we do not have it filed in
the clerk's office until it is presented to the Court. If the Court, after listening to the parties, or upon reading the complaint of the petition itself,
considers that it is one that we will grant, then it is ordered filed, but if we
come to the conclusion that we will not entertain the proposition, then it i§
not filed. That is done for the purpose of saving cost to the litigants. If
it is not filed, there is no cost attached to it. That is the object that we have
on that proposition.
There are many other matters that come up, that take time to dispose of.
For instance, in the matter of petition for bail bonds, we have given considerable time during the past year.
I might say upon that proposition that the members of the Supreme Court
are of the opinion that that law should be changed, and thrown back absolutely to the lower courts, to pass upon those petitions. I think that every
lawyer will realize the fact that the local judge who has tried the case, knows
more about it than the member of the Supreme Court can possibly know.
It comes up to us upon a cold piece of paper. We do not know the real
facts surrounding the particular case, as the local judge who tried the case
does. For that reason we are of the unanimous opinion that that law should
be changed and thrown back as it was, to the lower court, the trial judge, to
fix the bail bond, if one is granted.
We wish to report that we think we will have practically all criminal cases
disposed of by January 1, 1935. With the criminal cases and transfers out
of the way, we feel that we will be able to materially reduce the number of
other cases during the same year. At the present time there are about 240
cases on the docket, but many of them not fully briefed.
The Appellate Courts of this state have been criticized because of our
congested dockets and the long delay in the disposition of cases.
The work of our Courts has been compared with the work disposed of
by the higher courts of other states and the Supreme Court of the United
States. We are not complaining of the criticism. Before, however, a comparison is made, some salient facts should be considered. In many of the
other states there are more members of the court; some of them have commissioners to whom are distributed cases, and in fact constitute an additional
court, and in addition have high paid secretaries, some of whom are paid
as high as $6,000 per year. This amount of money secures the services of
able and mature lawyers who render great assistance to the individual judge,
and enables him to dispose of much more work than he could otherwise
accomplish. In our State each Judge is allowed one secretary or law clerk,
who receives $125 per month. It is impossible to secure the services of a
matured lawyer at this price, and hence we do not receive the assistance
that judges of other courts have. And they not only have their high paid
secretaries, but in addition their stenographers, who do the stenographic
work that is done in this State by law clerks. The same may be said of the
Supreme Court of the United States, but to a greater extent.
Right at this point, not so much at the present time as in the past, the
local courts, the circuit courts of the state, as you gentlemen all know, have
been criticized because they do not go so fast and accomplish so much as
the federal courts. As I have said on different occasions, if the same power
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were given to the judges of our circuit courts that is given to the judges
of our federal courts, and the same assistance, money given by the federal
government to the federal courts to send out any number of men that they
care to send to make investigations, especially in criminal cases, then the
local courts of our state would be able in a large measure to do the same
amount of work, and the same character of work as our federal courts do.
So the comparison, in my judgment, is and has been unfair, as to the
criticism that has been placed upon the local courts of our state. I think
the same may be said of some of the criticisms that have appeared from
time to time in the newspapers, as to the result of the work of the higher
courts of our state.
In conclusion, we can only promise that during the coming year that we
will make an honest and conscientious effort to carry on the work of the
Court with as much speed as is consistent with intelligent work.
Mr. Carl M. Gray of Petersburg read a prepared paper on the work of
the local bar association.
HOW CAN THE WORK OF THE LOCAL BAR
ASSOCIATION BE IMPROVED?
The general conditions prevailing, not only in this country but in the
world, have placed additional burdens upon the bar.
There has never been a time in the world's history when the bar has failed
to meet the responsibilities imposed upon it. No profession has contributed
more to the well-being of mankind and to the progress made in this country
than our honored profession. At this time, true to tradition, the legal profession is meeting the demands of this unusual time.
It seems to be one of the inherent rights of the American people to meet
and organize. Many organizations have been perfected without reason or
justification for their existence. With no purpose for the general welfare
of the citizens generally, these were created in some instances to further the
selfish interest of some individual or a small group of individuals. Such
organizations usually culminate in the organization of a small minority that
by reason of organization control the majority.
The various organizations of the bar do not fall within this category.
There is a reason for local bar association organization, for district organization, for state organization and for the American Bar Association.
A casual observation reveals that the medical profession is organized, that
the dental profession is organized, that the chiropractors are organized, and
that practically every branch of business has its organization functioning not
only for the welfare of the various professions but for the benefit of the
citizens generally.
Probably at no other time in the history of the legal profession has it
been confronted with so many complex and perplexing problems. The public
is in a state of unrest at this particular time, probably never paralleled in
the history of this country. Some say that our form of government is
actually on trial. Citizens generally are calling attention to the fact of the
responsibility resting upon the bar, to assist in solving the momentous problems now confronting civilization.
The bar is being subjected to criticism, much of which is unjustified, and
could well be classed as adverse destructive criticism.
The newspapers by their attitude have sought to charge the bar with
complete responsibility for the law's delay, and failure of the courts to
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function properly. These same papers are charging the bar with the responsibility for a cumbersome civil and criminal procedure burdened with technicalities and pitfalls which make it possible in many instances to defeat
justice or result in a miscarriage of justice..
Many of the editors who are responsible for this criticism if hailed into
court charged with the violation of the law or as a defendant in a civil suit
are the first to call upon some member of the legal profession to resort to
the technicalities he has been condemning and denouncing perpetually for a
period of years.
The laymen generally, and members of the clergy, especially, whenever
an opportunity presents itself, thrive on denouncing and condemning the
legal profession. Yet these same people when brought to the bar of justice
in a civil case or in a criminal case request a member of the legal profession
to resort to the tactics they have been condemning.
Members of our profession have contributed much by their action to the
continued condemnation of the bar and have done little, if anything, to
remove the cause for the criticism whether justifiable or not, constructive or
destructive.
At this particular time the bar is confronted with the problem of revising
the criminal code and of revising the civil code and to effect rules of court
calculated to relieve the congested condition of the docket in the trial court
and in the Supreme and Appellate Courts.
The bar is also confronted with the problem of illegal practice of the
law by banks and trust companies and other organizations. The public
generally does not realize that it is being penalized by this unauthorized
practice. They take the position that it is the lawyer's problem and is a
selfish interest of lawyers.
We are confronted by changes in government which makes it possible
for laymen to practice before the various boards and commissions in the
State and Federal Government, depriving members of the legal profession
of an opportunity to transact this business, which in most instances is matter
in which legal questions are involved, and the advice of counsel is needed;
and where legal services are required some member of the board or commission who is a lawyer handled the matter for the interested party, thus
depriving the legal profession of this practice.
These are problems that affect the individual members of the bar but they
cannot be solved by the action of the members of the bar in their individual
capacity. This is the reason for the organization of bar associations.
The local bar association is in a position to do more toward solving these
problems than the State Association or the National Association. Unfortunately many of the local bar associations do not meet regularly, have no well
defined program, do not meet for the purpose of discussing the various
problems confronting the bar. Many of the local associations meet only
when some member dies, and they meet then for the purpose of drafting a
resolution and purchasing flowers and making arrangements to attend the
funeral. Such associations contribute nothing to the solution of the problems
confronting the bar.
Every bar in the State of Indiana should have a live, virile association,
no matter how small the bar may be. Programs should be arranged in order
that the members of the association may have an opportunity to discuss the
problems confronting the bar, and to discuss the problems confronting the
local bar. Regular meetings should be had. I would suggest one meeting
each month; that a subject be assigned to some member of the bar to present
some problem confronting the bar; that the local bar take a position in reference to the problem.
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It has been my opinion for some time that the local bar should be permitted to select delegates to attend the meeting of the State Bar Association,
and that these delegates have authority to represent the local association and
that these delegates selected from the local associations should have the
exclusive right to select the officers for the State Bar Association and transact
all business of the association. If this were done there would be a coordination of the local and State Bar Association. More interest would be manifested in the local association and the State Bar Association. Also in the
meeting of the State Bar Association delegates should be selected to attend
the meetings of the American Bar Association. These delegates should have
the exclusive right to conduct the business of the American Bar Association,
elect the officers of that Association, and transact all other business of that
association, thus bringing about a coordination between the State Bar Association and the American Bar Association.
Under the present conditions, however, these last suggestions are impractical for the reason that the local associations are not functioning.
It is the opinion of the speaker that the bar finds itself in this position at
this time. Many of these problems are going to be solved and if the bar
is not interested enough to solve the problems the laymen will solve these
problems for the bar, and no doubt they will be solved unsatisfactorily from
the legal profession's standpoint. Certainly there is a place for the local bar
associations, State Bar Association and American Bar Association. The
success of these depends upon the strength of the local associations. Likewise the many problems confronting the legal profession today depend upon
the local associations for their solutions. As individuals it is incumbent upon
all of us to see to it that our local bar associations are organized and that
they function after being organized. If we carry out this part of our obligation to the profession, we need have no fear for the future of the Bar.
Chief Judge William H. Bridwell delivered the report of the Appellate
Court of Indiana.
REPORT ON THE WORK OF THE APPELLATE COURT
Mr. President, Fellow Members of the Bench and Bar: In line with a
custom established in recent years, and at the invitation of the President
of our Association, it is my privilege to submit to you at this time a report
as to the work of the Appellate Court.
If there be any among you who feel that you have cases pending in this
court of which final disposition should have been made before this time, in
so far as our court can do so, the information concerning conditions, which
I shall give you, may furnish the explanation.
The work of the court has been continuously increasing during the past
few years, and the time of the court is necessarily given to some matters other
than the writing of opinions, although such other matters are directly connected with the work.
For many years the rules of the Supreme and Appellate Courts have provided that oral arguments will be heard when proper request therefor is
made. These arguments are usually helpful, and are welcomed by the various
members of the bench, but no denial can be made of the fact that they consume much time, tending because of this, to lessen the number of opinions
which might otherwise be written. In more than one-half of the cases now
fully briefed and distributed, or ready for distribution, such arguments are
requested and these must be heard before the cases are ready for decision.
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During the past three years approximately one hundred and fifty arguments
per year have been heard. We call attention to this fact, not for the purpose
of criticism of members of the bar for requesting such argument, but only
that you may know how much of the time of the court is taken for this
purpose.
There is another reason which has at least some bearing upon the ability
of the court to dispose of its business with sufficient promptness to keep
it abreast with its docket. Prior to December 30, 1930, the court, acting
pursuant to the provisions of Section 1361, Burn's R. S. of 1926, had been
affirming many cases without a written opinion. Approximately 64 cases
per year had been so decided and this estmate of the number affirmed in
such manner is reached by taking an average for the three years immediately
preceding said date.
In 1928 there were thirty-eight of such decisions, in the following year
eighty-eight, and in 1930 sixty-six. On December 30, 1930, our Supreme
Court decided the case of Hunter et al. vs. Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago
and St. Louis Railway Company, reported in the 202 Indiana 328, overruling
a prior decision of the court, and requiring of the Appellate Court that,
when deciding any case, it "give a statement in writing of each question
arising in the record of such case and the decision of the court thereon."
The effect of this decision is apparent. We have been guided and controlled by it, and make no complaint concerning the necessity of writing an
opinion in each case, but, in the three and one-half years which have elapsed
since the decision was handed down, the court, but for the opinion, would
have made final disposition of more appeals than it has been able to do, and
the result is, more, cases pending. An average of 64 cases per year decided
by per curian "opinions would have meant 224 fewer cases on the docket than
now appear, and, taking in consideration the time necessary to be spent by
the judge who holds the record, and by the other members of the court, in
determining whether such an opinion should be rendered in any case being
considered, it would seem that at least many cases per year might be disposed
of in this manner, and the court thereby enabled to reach and decide cases
before it within a much less period of time than at present.
On July 1st, this year, 405 cases were on the court's docket. Of this number 244 are fully briefed and distributed or ready for distribution. In 148
of these cases oral arguments are requested. On January 1st, 1931, two
hundred and sixty-four cases were pending. During that year 267 new
appeals were filed, in 1932 three hundred and twenty-three, in 1933 three
hundred and six, and up to July 1st, this year, one hundred and nineteen new
cases have been docketed. It may be of interest to you to learn that during
this same period of time, appeals filed in the Appellate Court outnumber
more than two to one appeals docketed in our Supreme Court. Number 15
of Volume 3 of the Indiana Advance Reporter shows that from March 20th,
to July 2nd, 1934, twenty-five new appeals were docketed in the Supreme
Court and eighty-five in the Appellate Court.
In approximately seventy-five per cent of all cases decided petitions for
rehearing follow, and must be given due consideration. At present only
twelve of such petitions await action by the court, as it is our custom to
give prompt attention to any such petition so that the end of litigation may
be reached without any more delay than is required.
In this connection, and in order to correct an erroneous impression which
seems to exist among some members of the bar as to the manner of handling
such petitions, it seems desirable to state how this is done. The petition,
with its accompanying briefs is, when filed, immediately delivered by the
clerk to the messenger of the court who distributes one copy of the briefs
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filed to each member of the court. The judge who wrote the opinion, before
submitting the petition to the court for action, must give written notice to
each of his associates as to when he will ask the court to consider the matter,
and this notice must be served at least five days before the date fixed.
Further time for consideration is granted if desired by any member of the
court. Occasionally, when a petition for rehearing has been denied, a motion
to reconsider the ruling is presented. Since such a motion is not authorized,
either by statute or the rules of court, it has been our practice to strike any
such motion from the files.
Many cases appealed to the court must, by reason of statutory provisions,
be given precedence over cases already filed, fully briefed and awaiting
decision. All Industrial Board cases appealed, and there are many of them;
all appeals from Juvenile Courts, and causes transferred to the advance
docket on motion of some interested party for good cause shown, are in
this class. In most instances, advanced cases are decided within thirty to
sixty days from the time when fully briefed, even where oral arguments
are requested and must be heard. Of necessity this brings about a condition
which does cause some cases to remain pending for a longer period of time
than is desirable. From July 1st, 1933, to July 1st, 1934, our court has written and handed down one hundred and seventy-two opinions and five additional opinions in cases where rehearings were granted.
In this report we have placed before you the conditions as they exist, and
I hope that it contains nothing which will be taken as in the nature of an
excuse, for none need be offered. My associates on the bench are diligent
workers, each imbued with the desire and purpose to dispatch the business
of the court with as much speed as is consistent with the responsibility resting
upon them, and the importance of the duty to be discharged.

At the conclusion of Judge Bridwell's report the following discussion was
indulged from the floor.
JUDGE REMY : Mr. President, I want to say a word or two. I know something about the conditions brought about by the Hunter opinion of the
Supreme Court. I am not criticizing the Supreme Court. I suppose they
had as good a right to decide as they did as anyone. I have no criticism of
the Supreme Court in its decision, in the opinion written by Judge Jordan,
written thirty years or more ago, which held that under the law, on the
statute, the Appellate Court did not have to write opinions when they reversed
a case. They had as much right to affirm a case without an opinion as
anyone. I assume the judges of the Supreme Court were just as honest
and thorough in their investigations of questions, and they decided unanimously that the Appellate Court was bound to write an opinion in every case..
Having served on the Appellate Court twelve years and having followed
the work of the Appellate Court, I will say to you in all sincerity, I don't
think we have ever had a better Appellate Court than we have today. I
say to you that the Appellate Court can never do the work and keep up
with the court. It means 64 or more opinions every year to be written, and
if a judge writes thirty or thirty-five opinions a year, he does a good job. We
are going to have two or more appellate judges just as sure as the lower
courts are going ahead and do the work they are. We are going to have
two or three more judges or the Hunter case must be overruled. The Appellate judges can not do the work, and it isn't fair for the lawyers of the
state to criticize the Appellate Court for being behind. They have done the
work as the courts that preceded them, but here they have to write an
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opinion in every case. If the Supreme Court had to write an opinion in
every case, do you suppose we would see the reports from Washington?
Do you suppose we would see the wonderful reports that Chief Justice
Hughes is doing?
There are hundreds of cases in the courts in Indiana where no opinion
needs to be written. In many courts like New York and other states they
write memorandum opinions and the litigants are just as well off. If there
are six judges and all cases now are passed upon by the Appellate CourtI assume that is right. When I was on the Court for a number of years,
every case was a six-judge opinion. Formerly there were opinions handed
down by three judges.
Now, and for the last ten years, every opinion and every decision of the
Appellate Court is the opinion or decision of six judges.
Now, there are lots of decisions that might be made without opinion.
Personally, I have felt, and I may be wrong about it, that when the legislature created a court of appeal, as they created the Appellate Court, when
the Constitution provides for such a court, and under the rule that a right
of appeal is purely statutory, that the legislature that created the court
might enact a statute that opinions need not be written except where there
was a reversal, but that is not the law now, and if the Hunter case stands,
be assured that the Appellate Court can never get the work up. It is as
impossible as it could possibly be, because they can not write the opinions
necessary. I know what it takes. I know what it takes to write thirty or
forty opinions a year. A man thinks it is an easy job-he doesn't know
anything about it. It is hard work to write thirty or forty opinions a year,
and do your work, in helping the other five judges reach a correct conclusion,
and debate with them whether your opinion is right, around the table.
So I wanted to say just this: be prepared, either for the reversal of the
decision in the Hunter case, or for eight judges on the Appellate Court.
Otherwise, the work will not be kept up.
PRESIDENT SEEBIRT: Judge Remy, we are glad to have your views. Are
there any others who wish to discuss any questions?
MR. BOMBERGER:

It occurs to me that we might get somewhere if we

agreed upon the definition of the word "opinion". In the Hunter case, the
judge laid down an opinion. Must an opinion be written as in the Hunter
case, or is it left to the court to write an opinion in its own way?
JUDGE REMY: The opinion holds that every question raised must be discussed and passed upon; it holds that what was said in the constitutional
convention, that is, putting in the footnotes, applies in the Appellate Court
the same as the Supreme Court. So far every judge under that decision
must discuss every question raised, just as the Supreme Court under the
constitutional provision is required to discuss every question raised, and in
the same way.
MR. BOMBERGER: Some time ago I was very much interested in a discussion of this question, and the gentleman said the Appellate Court might
make some speed if it adopted its own definition of an opinion. For instance,
it could still come under an opinion if they said, "We have examined the
evidence in this case and find that the verdict is sustained by sufficient evidence."
What would the Supreme Court do with that?
'JUDGE REnmY:
I would say the Supreme Court has done it both ways.
You will find that some of the ablest judges that ever sat on the Supreme
Court have examined the instructions and taking the whole thing, I think
that is even within the Supreme Court rule, but you perhaps would not
find a majority of the court that would agree to that. I think that is suf-
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ficient. I think that if the court finds, that it examines all the instructions
and would say, in four or five lines, that instructions were made and we
have examined the instructions and take them as a whole, they expressly state
the law of the case, I would say'we didn't discuss the evidence unless there
was some particular question. Usually we didn't, .and I never did if there
was evidence to sustain the verdict, I disposed of it in four or five lines,
with one of the assignments of errors that the decision of the trial court
is not sustained by sufficient evidence. We have examined the evidence and
find there is sufficient evidence to sustain the verdict, and let it go at that.
It may be the court could do that. I don't think they need to discuss all
those questions, but you might not get all the members of the court in the
light of constitutional provision, in reference to the Supreme Court writing
these, and in reference to the Hunter case, saying that the Appellate Court
was bound by that same rule. 'Personally, I think that it would be betterI am just talking for myself-if the Hunter decision had never been written
and Jordan's opinion stood, and the Appellate Court today would be three
and a half times 64 opinions ahead of where it is today.
PRESIDENT SEEBIRT: Is there anything further?
JUDGE GAUSE: Mr. President, I heartily agree with Judge Remy's contention. The Appellate Court ought not to have to write opinions when
they affirm a case, unless they think it is sufficiently justified. However, I
would hate to see them get around that in the way Mr. Bomberger suggests.
I think if they are going to write an opinion they ought to give reasons for
conclusions.
I think if it is at all possible, if the Supreme Court changes its attitude
in the Hunter case, the work of the Court would be much enhanced by
relieving them of the necessity of writing an opinion, but when they do
write an opinion, let's have an opinion.
JUDGE HARVEY CURTIS: I wanted to say to you that I agree with what
Judge Remy has said about the work of the Appellate Court. Without seeking to interfere with the Supreme Court, it is my opinion in the little experience I have gained in the three and a half years I have been there, the Court
could write an average of thirty or forty decisions per year, by the method
that was in vogue and used before the Hunter case came down.
In answer to what Mr. Bomberger says with reference to discussion of
the points raised, we will assume, Mr. Bomberger, the motion for new trial
raises 75 questions-and we have seen them many times-as to the admission or exclusion of evidence, and that there are five or six independent
assignments of error. Then it is totally impossible, under the Hunter case,
to write an opinion, as was suggested by Mr. Bomberger. You can write
an opinion and say that the verdict of the jury is sustained, or the decision
is sustained, easily. You can say that you have examined the instructions
given, but there is no error in them, and you haven't done much harm. But
here is an attorney who puts in a motion for new trial, and the lower court
has made 75 questions. What are you going to do about that? This court,
as suggested by Judge Gause, must honestly take up those questions and
honestly pass upon them, and if we could affirm cases where there is really
nothing much presented, where in the judgment of six men of the Appellate
Court, if we would be permitted to affirm that case without an opinion, in
my judgment, the work of the Appellate Court would be very much enhanced
and the ends of justice would be as fully met as they are now.
MR. FRANK MILLER: If we need more judges, let's have them. It might
mean that there couldn't be so many culverts built. Why should we lawyers
worry about the price? If we need more judges, I am in favor of having
them.
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It occurs to me, and this presents itself to anyone who
JUDGE MORAN:
has had any experience, if every question that is presented by the original
brief is not worked out intelligently and with some degree of care, you will
encounter the same question on petition for rehearing, and there isn't much
time saved. You might as well work it out and work it out intelligently, in
my judgment, as to have it come back again on petition for rehearing. I
believe the best satisfaction where lawyers honestly present these questions
is to work them out, because they will come back to you in the form of
petition for rehearing.
MR. RICHMAN: I desire to second Judge Remy's motion that the Hunter
case be overruled.
PRESIDENT SEEBiRT: The motion is carried.
MR. RICHMAN: I had occasion to examine that opinion some time ago
when I was endeavoring to find a way of helping the Appellate Court to
catch up with its work, and I came to the conclusion then that the reasoning
was bad.
As to Mr. Bomberger's suggestion, I might say that the Supreme Court
may not always get the chance to say what it thinks of the kind of opinions
that Mr. Bomberger suggests that the Appellate Court should write.
We had an experience recently that illustrates my point. The Appellate
Court wrote an opinion of the character suggested by Mr. Bomberger, and
we came to the conclusion that if the court had not been able to see the
point raised in our original briefs, it would do no good to file a brief for
a rehearing, and we advised our client to pay the costs and quit.
JUDGE TITSWORTH: I would like to suggest in case of trial court, there
might be 75 trials of error and still not much question raised.
PRESIDENT SEEBIRT: If the President may make an observation, it seems
to me the most practical suggestion made is this: it ought to be the business
of the State Bar Association to examine into this question of the conditions
in courts of review. If there aren't enough men there to do the work, the
gentleman is right, it is the duty of this state toward the citizens and lawyers,
to provide the men to dispatch this business, to do it efficiently and at the
proper time.
The session was adjourned at four-twenty p. m.

THURSDAY EVENING
July 12, 1934
President Seebirt relinquished the chair for the evening to Professor
James J. Robinson, of Indiana University Law School. Mr. Robinson introduced the first speaker of the evening, Professor Rollin M. Perkins, of the
Law School of the State University of Iowa.
.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

When the Wickersham Commission filed its report there was contained
within its pages a rather severe criticism of the police because of the third
degree methods, and I am sure you will recall the answer which was made
by the police on that occasion.
The answer itself was not really concise, but when boiled down we find
that the police disposed of this criticism in two rather short statements.
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1. Third degree methods are not used by the police anywhere in the
country. It is nothing but newspaper talk.
2. It would be utterly impossible to enforce the criminal law without
using third degree methods.
That is merely thrown out as a caution that we as lawyers seek to avoid
lefthanded answers in dealing with criticisms which are directed at legal
aspects of the administration of criminal justice.
The Toastmaster referred to the Missouri Crime Survey. We have had
several studies of this kind, actual investigations into the accomplishment,
in the field of law enforcement. These studies have not been particularly
encouraging. They have shown that for the most part we have fallen short
of what reasonably should be expected in the actual administration of justice.
But another thing they have shown, and it is really this which I have
in mind for the moment; without exception they have shown among many
other facts this important point: that when we find a breakdown in law
enforcement, when in a particular instance we find that we do not accomplish what should be accomplished in this direction, we find that much more
frequently this breakdown is due to the fault of men than it is due to the
fault of machinery.
As someone has stated the matter, even a rather defective .machinery for
the enforcement of justice could be made to operate fairly well if in the
hands of the right persons; while the best scheme that could possibly be
devised would be futile and helpless if in charge of those who are incompetent and untrustworthy.
This in itself requires no comment, but within the last few months there
has been a tendency to draw a conclusion from this that is entirely unwarranted; that is, because of this fact we can ignore the machiner j of justice.
We need pay no attention to that; all we need think of is in the men in
charge of it.
We know that a mechanic of sufficient skill and ability can make almost
any car run after a fashion, and we know that the best automobile ever put
on the market can be quickly reduced to a wreck if put into the hands of a
person who is entirely incompetent to drive it. But we don't hear anybody
saying he is not interested in what kind of a car he has, he is not interested
in year, make, model, and all he is interested in is the mechanics. We don't
hear that, because it is a conclusion that does not make sense.
And to return to the administration of criminal justice that we can ignore
the machinery for the enforcement of the law: Men play a most significant
part in the machinery. But men must work with machinery, and furthermore, the more efficient is the machinery, the easier will be the task of getting
the right persons in charge of it. The end to be achieved, of course, is to
have a thoroughly efficient machinery of justice in the hands of persons who
are entirely competent and trustworthy.
With respect to the two parts of this goal, machinery and personnel, personnel is in the hands of the general public. Lawyers are a part of the
general public, and they have an interest in this matter, and apparently even
more than the average interest, and that is a fortunate thing because probably
we have no group other than the lawyer group itself, equipped by its training
to make an advance upon the entire battle-front in this war against crime.
Others can make an attack on one point or another, but sooner or later, the
legal profession will have to take charge of this advance along the entire
front itself.
But even in preparing for a campaign of that kind, it is the course of
wisdom to focus attention now on one sector and now on another, to see that
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adequate preparation is made. Therefore, it is quite proper that we should
turn our attention for a moment to the machinery of justice itself.
Now, as we turn our attention to this, it would be useful to have a little
insight into the background. I have an idea that the time may come when
histories will be recorded perhaps more in the form of talking pictures than
in the printed pages of books, that it would be very useful to us at this
moment if we could throw upon the screen an actual incident in the enforcement of justice in the very early days. Having no such film, we will have
to do the next best thing.
Let us, therefore, for just an instant see if we can project ourselves back
to the very dawn of civilization in the British Isles. We will see the men
there engaged in the battle, or the chase, or whatever the excitement of the
particular day may be, and at the close of the day they may return home.
One of these men as he enters his crude hut, finds that it has been broken
into and one of his spare swords taken away in his absence.
Now, the matter of the spare sword is a matter of great importance to
him. He becomes excited and something must be done about it. One thing
we may be sure, he does not do-he does not grab the telephone and call
the police, for two reasons. One is there is no telephone, and another thing,
there is no such thing as a police force.
He resorts to a different technique. He rushes into the clearing of his
hut, which serves as an ancient street, and begins to shout and blow upon
his horn, clanging his sword upon his shield, making all the noise he is
capable of creating, and at the sound of this, the neighbors come from
near and far. Before they get there, they begin to join into this din and
noise.
After they get there, there is a momentary pause until he makes the explanation, and he tells them that someone has stolen his sword, while he was
away.
It may be there is no clew available. He has to take this loss and do
nothing about it. But at least there is this to say about this method of law
enforcement, having the community in one spot, if there is any clew there,
it will be immediately available. It may be that one of the women saw a
stranger near the cottage before the men returned. She is inclined to
think that he did break into it. She knows he had a sword when he went
away, and is rather inclined to think he did not have when he first was
seen by her. She gives such a description of the man as she can, and perhaps
points out the path that he took. At once all the men start in that direction
on a run, and begin to shout and call and blow upon their horns, and clang
steel on steel. The ancient hue and cry is in full sway.
As they pass on, mile after mile, this noise will let up to a considerable
extent as they have other purposes for their breath, but if their line of
pursuit brings them anywhere near any other town or village, as they
approach that place, that din will swell forth again and those people will
come out and another explanation will be made. Possibly someone there,
on his way home saw a person who answers this description. He carefully
avoided that community, but saw him some distance away, and he knows
the path he took from there, and on they go with these new recruits. Needless to say, these trips often ended in failure, and the men had to go home.
It may be, for instance, as the group we were watching top a little rise,
they see a man a little distance away with a sword in his hand, and perhaps
there is something so unique about that weapon that at that distance the
owner can identify it. They give a great shout and on they go. The hue and
cry is on its last lap.

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

At this stage, it seldom fails. If any of the pursuers are fleet enough to
get near the man, they will catch him, and the others will come up.
At this stage we are sure we will hear nothing about the law's delay.
There will be no delay. We will hear nothing about professional bondsmen.
There is no bond. No discussion will be had on the subject of technical
appeal, because there will be no appeal. We will hear no reference to complicated rules of evidence, because the rules of evidence are very few and
very simple. There are only two; that is, that anybody other than the
accused who has anything to say will be permitted to say it if it doesn't take
very long; and the other is, the accused will not be permitted to say anything.
In those days, the theory was that the accused would deny the guilt no
matter what the truth would be, so there was no formality. This man will
be hanged to a nearby tree or crushed under a boulder or thrown into a
.nearby lake or stream or thrown over a cliff, or disposed of in whatever
seems to be the best manner with the facilities at hand.
Justice was swift in those days. You will note at once no reference to
the familiar couplet, "swift and certain," because it was not so very certain.
You will note also a rather striking resemblance between the hue and cry
of ancient times and the lynching mob of more recent days.
It differed from the lynching mob in that it had back of it the sanction
of the law and was conducted with a certain amount of formality or ritual,
but a man accused of crime under that system had no safeguard whatever.
And because of this today, since we have constructed what we refer to as
the common law courts, we find them throwing around the accused a certain
safeguard for his protection. They overdid this, and before long we find the
criminal surrounded by so much protection as to afford an unreasonable
handicap to the enforcement of the criminal law.
The difficulty of conviction in the common law courts resulted in the
course of time to a reaction, and we find a tendency to try certain of these
cases in a certain tribunal in certain courts in which there was no red tape
and no technicality. In this other court, there was no difficulty in securing
convictions. In fact, it was so easy to secure convictions in this other court
that we get some shudder at the mere mention of its name, and, of course,
the court itself you all recognize, as the court of the Star Chamber.
Now, the utter inadequacy of any safeguard of the man accused in the
Court of Star Chamber led to a general hostility against that tribunal in the
minds of the English people. This opposition grew until it could no longer
be resisted and then the court was overthrown. No new machinery of any
kind was set up to take care of the cases at the time the Star Chamber was
overthrown, so they were all turned back once mbre into the common law
courts, with all the red tape and over-protection and technicalities that caused
so much dissatisfaction in an earlier period.
Now, from this inadequate and hasty reference to the historical background, you will be able to see four distinct points in the administration of
criminal justice in England. The first is the period in which the man
accused has no safeguard whatever for his protection. The second is the
period in which he is over-protected to such an extent as to cause a handicap
upon the enforcement of the law. The third is almost identical with the
first, and the fourth identical with the second, and it so happens that the
administration of the criminal law in England was in this fourth period, a
period of over-protection at the time we began to construct the machinery
for law enforcement in this country, and that was the pattern which we
followed here. Perhaps the word "followed" is not an appropriate word
because the courts in this country went further with this matter of overprotection than had ever been accomplished by the English judges, and this
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thing of carrying on and on this over-protection went over into the present
century itself.
For instance, in the present century a man was accused of the crime of
rape. The evidence against him was so clear and convincing that the jury
lost no time in bringing in a judgment of guilty. The lawyers had some
difficulty in the appeal. It was found useless to talk about guilt or innocence.
They didn't want to say anything about the trial itself. Then they focused
their attention on the indictment and that was difficult because that had been
drawn with care for the most part. Then they said, "Look at that awful
sentence. It says 'against the peace and dignity of State', whereas it should
say, 'against the peace and dignity of the State' ". The court said, "That
is true", and because of the omission of the word "the" at this important
point, the conviction was reversed.
This case does not stand alone. A number of other cases can be found
in which the reversal was found for exactly the same reason, but these
other cases had not received so much widespread attention. They didn't
involve such serious offenses.
There is an earlier case that seems tb me in some respects to go further
than this. At one time in West Virginia the indictment was supposed to
be against the peace and dignity of the state of West Virginia, and at that
time this decision was reversed because the word "West" was abbreviated,
capital W. The court of West Virginia thought no man could be convicted
under such a technicality.
One particular case of technical variance, and what was spoken of as the
most extreme case of technical variance, was the Delaware case in which
a man was convicted of the larceny of a pair of shoes. The indictment
accused him of stealing a pair of shoes, but the evidence brought out that
he had picked up two shoes for the right foot. The Delaware court said,
"That doesn't constitute a pair of shoes." - If the indictment had read two
shoes, he would have been convicted for stealing the shoes, but since the
indictment said "a pair of shoes," that wouldn't do. .
That is spoken of as the most absurd case of technical variance.
It seems to me there is another, the Alabama case, that ought to be placed
in nomination. That is the case in which a man was convicted under a
statute which made it grand larceny to steal any cow or "any animal of the
cow kind." It was proved beyond question that the defendant stole a steer,
and the Alabama court, in all seriousness said, "The steer, being a male
animal, is not of the cow kind." The decision was reversed.
It is not necessary for me to go on with these cases because I know you
could recite to me as many as I could recite to you. Neither is it necessary
for me to mention such technicalities which interfered with the enforcement
of the law. That could be discerned from the reading of the law itself,
and the indictment and the proof.
As a matter of fact, the whole scheme of procedure was shot through
with matters which might cause a failure, an unreasonable failure, in the
enforcement of the law.
Dean Wigmore expressed the situation in this manner: A man has been
accused of larceny. Is he guilty? WXVell, no matter; that is not the problem.
Of course, we realize that is an over-statement for the purpose of emphasis; yet we are familiar with so many instances in which the case turned
on some point that had nothing whatever to do with guilt or innocence that
we can see full well why Dean \Wigmore put the matter in that language.
Now, at this point, of course, the suggestion may be offered that it would
be better for ninety-nine guilty men to escape than far one who is innocent
to be punished, but if we analyze the situation, we will find that that is
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merely misleading in this connection. We have been talking about matters
here which are not important for the protection of innocence. An innocent
man does not require an absurd technicality for his acquittal. It is not even
in his interest to have the case disposed of in such a fashion, because friends
and neighbors will all assume he is guilty, notwithstanding such an outcome
of the case.
We might also refer to the long and absurd delays that -have so frequently
crept int6 our enforcement of the criminal law. These are a fine thing for
the man who is guilty, because the longer the period of time between the
event and the trial, the more difficult it will be to get at the real facts of
the matter. But a long period of delay may be of positive detriment to the
man who is innocent.
As a matter of fact, we find in our criminal procedure many matters which
are of benefit to the man who is guilty, which would be a detriment to the
innocent man.
How did those things ever get into our scheme of enforcing the law, where
judges were looking around for excuses to acquit a man who is guilty?
We, as lawyers, know the ans~ver. Yes, judges were merely looking
around for some excuse to give as a reason for not convicting a person of
whose guilt there was no question whatever.
The layman who encounters this fact is ready once and for all to condemn
not only those English judges, but the entire legal profession, and yet the
matter can hardly be disposed of so summarily as that. It requires more
attention.
We find in the early English law, felonies were punished by death. The
death penalty interests us for the moment. The English judges were very
hesitant about putting offenses under this category, under the felonies label,
felonies punishable by death. If you used both hands, you will have fingers
that are not needed after the count is completed. But to this little group
of common law felonies by statute there was added a veritable flood of
felonies. Blackstone tells us that in his time there were 160 felonies without
benefit of clergy, offenses which by statute had been put in such position
that there was no option by the judge other than to order the execution of
any one duly convicted of that offense, and at such a time it was rather the
common thing for the judge to find himself confronted by some miserable
wretch who was guilty and yet whose transgression was so relatively minor
that the whole sense of the time cried out against taking his life for what
he had done, and it was at such a time that.the judges applied a microscope
to the record, as an excuse for doing what everybody knew ought to be
done, namely, to save that poor rascal from being executed.
Now, can we find it in our hearts to criticize those English judges for
doing that? I am sure we would be ready with our criticism if they had
not found some way to override that difficult penal law.
The difficulty is not with the cases where the judges were looking for an
excuse to save the life of some petty wrong-doer. The real difficulty is that
our emphasis on precedent. After an excuse of that nature had been used
in one case, the judges felt bound to use it in another, and in the second
case the man might be saved from penalty, even having committed a most
heinous crime.
Now, when we were beginning to develop a scheme for the enforcement of
criminal law in this country, there were few books available, and yet it was
possible for the judges and lawyers to know how these cases had been
handled in England. They did not have the full picture. They did not
know why it had been done, and so they jumped to the conclusion that for
some reason they didn't understand, the longer experience in the Mother
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Country had demonstrated that there was a need for this microscopic search
for technicalities in the enforcement of the criminal law, and that was the
way the matter was handled in this country, and as we have seen, that went
into the present century itself.
At the present moment, the tide has definitely turned. No one who is
actually alive to the situation can question that there is a rising sentiment
against absurd technicalities in the administration of criminal justice, and
at this point I think it will become apparent why this hasty reference is
made to the historical background. If we look to the history, in every case
where we have undertaken a major difference in the law, we have turned
from one extreme to the other. We find two basic social interests at sharp
conflict. There is the interest of the group which is to have convictions
easy. There is the interest of the individual which is to have convictions
difficult. Those two interests come into conflict, and throughout all of our
history, we have constructed a machinery for the enforcement of the criminal
law based upon just one of these interests, sometimes one and sometimes
the other; but never both. If we were thinking of the interest of the group,
we left the individual without any safeguard whatever. If we were thinking
of the individual, then we threw around him so much over-protection as to
embarrass the enforcement of the law.
The end to be achieved, of course, is to formulate machinery for the
enforcement of the criminal law which will not overlook either one of those
interests, but we can see, I am sure, that there is a real danger at this point.
If the legal profession should fail to recognize its responsibility in this
respect, without question this rising tide of public opinion will in the course
of days sweep over the legal profession and refuse to follow its leadership.
And if this task should fall into unskilled hands, if the reformation of our
criminal procedure should be done by people who do not understand what
it is all about, then there is every reason to fear that while they are removing
these obstacles which benefit only the man who is guilty, they might at the
same time sweep away those safeguards which are essential for the protection of innocence, and if that should happen, needless to say it would be a
catastrophe of major importance. It was with this very thought in mind
that the American Law Institute some years ago undertook the drafting of
a code of criminal procedure.
This code was drafted with painstaking care. Two experts in this field
gave their time and attention for a period of five years to this work. A
committee of twelve advisers gave very liberally of their time and attention
for this five-year period. Many local and state bar associations set up
committees who offered advice. Every provision was passed upon by the
Committees of the American Law Institute. Many of those were made up
of lawyers and judges of courts of last resort, and finally the code was considered section by section on the open floor of the American Law Institute
at two of its annual sessions.
Now, the technique in drafting this code was this: these two reporters,
as they were called, two men who were assigned the chief responsibility in
drafting the code, divided this matter up between them, one taking one
chapter, and one the next. One, for instance, started with the chapter on
Arrest, and before he attempted to write a word on that chapter, he went
to members of the bar and said to them, "I want you to bring me the law
in each of the forty-eight states on the subject of arrest. Go to the statutes
and supplement that by the decided cases so you can show me what the law
is in each of the forty-eight states. Then take a look at England and Canada,
and see if there is anything different there."
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So before he attempted to draft this chapter, he had before him the laws
of the forty-eight states and England and Canada, and with that, drafted
what seemed to him to be the ideal chapter on the subject of arrest.
This was sent out to a committee of twelve advisers, and after they had
studied it separately, they called a meeting, the meeting lasting three or
four days to a week, and they considered this, not section by section, but
literally word by word; subjected it to the most severe criticism, and this
criticism was taken down in shorthand, so after the meeting adjourned, the
reporter had the searching criticism which had resulted from this meeting.
In the light of that, he prepared another draft, and another meeting was
held, and more criticism, and another draft, until one was reached which
satisfied the reporter and the advisers.
Then it went to the Council of the Institute, where frequently there were
suggestions which resulted in its being sent back for revision, and even when
it went to the Institute itself, on the open floor of the meeting, there were
a number of suggestions which required further attention on the part of
these committees and their advisers.
You will find in the Institute code no basic provision which is strange and
unusual. In the years gone by, we have made many, the difficulty has been
that one state has improved at one point and another at another-patchwork,
without any systematic effort to organize the whole into a unified system,
and what the Institute really attempted to do was to draw the best in actual
operation in the different states and put this together as a code of criminal
procedure.
It is rather a common thing, for example, for a lawyer in one state to
hear lawyers in another state arguing over some provision, and he says,
"What is the argument about? That is the way the law has been for years."
It has been that way in his state, but not in the other.
It has been my pleasure to hear a great many lawyers argue about the
code for criminal procedure. I have heard lawyers say, "The code satisfies
me as it is." I have heard them say, "If I were drafting the code it would
be different, but recognizing the give and take that must be recognized in
drafting a code, I will accept the code as it is."
I have heard lawyers say, "The Institute's code is all right in the main,
but certain sections will have to be changed before it can receive my
approval."
And it may interest you to know that as far as my experience is concerned, far more criticism has come from lawyers by reason that the code
doesn't go far enough rather than that it goes too far, and the reason for
that is this: the lawyers in some parts of the country are ready to go farther
than the country as a whole is ready to go. This code, of course, was
drafted with the thought that it should be reasonably satisfactory to people
in all parts of the country.
Now, no one should suppose for a moment that the Institute's code was
drafted with the thought in mind that anybody interested in the subject
must take this code just as it is or not at all. That was not the thought for
a moment. It was thought that by having this pattern code some group in
some state might be interested in one chapter or perhaps in one section.
They would have here the Institute's suggestion as to what to do on that
subject.
The thought was that a group in another state might be interested in an
entirely new code on criminal procedure, and they might perhaps have some
half dozen matters in which they were especially interested, matters in which
perhaps the provisions they had in mind would not correspond with those
in the code.
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But it was thought that with this pattern code before them, they would
find a multitude of details worked out in advance, so that they could concentrate their whole attention on these few matters which particularly interested them. Then by fitting this into the Institute's code, they would have
the entire project completed with just a fraction of the effort that would
be required if they had nothing of this kind to start with.
But I am taking too much of your time. Whatever we would say about
this subject, let me point out in conclusion, certainly in a field which is as
important as the enforcement of the criminal law, and particularly with all
of the significance that is attached to the wave of demand for change just
now, and with reference to proposed legislation in such a field, which has
been drafted with the painstaking care that has been given to Institute's
Code of Criminal Procedure, certainly we find something which is entfiled
to the very thoughtful study and attention of the state and local bar associations, in all parts of the country, and for this reason, it has been a matter of
more than ordinary interest for me to have an opportunity to speak to you
upon this subject.

Chairman Robinson introduced the Honorable Philip Lutz, Jr., Attorney
General of Indiana, who read a prepared paper.
SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENTS OF OUR CRIMINAL
CODE OF PROCEDURE IN INDIANA
Our Association meets again in annual convention to record the annual
story of the increasing cost of crime, variously estimated to cost around
thirteen billions of dollars annually-six times as much as public education
costs-three times the annual budget of the Federal Government-three
billions more than Europe owes us-the output of the motor industry is only
five billion. Crime is organized internationally, nationally and locally, and
the success of organized crime is such that some criminologists say the
chances for punishment are about one in twenty, which is some odds in
favor of the criminal. Statistics gathered by the United States Department
of the small per cent of defendants who ever come to trial and are punished
is appalling. Indiana is no exception to the wanton disregard for the laws
of the state and country. Crime must be made less profitable and more
risky to the criminal.
We might have the best laws in the country; those dealing with the definition of crime, the apprehension and arrest of criminals, and the procedure
for trial and punishment, but unless there is a fair and honest administration
on the part of officers and juries, backed by public sentiment, these laws are
a nullity. So I want to emphasize in the beginning that sentiment for law
enforcement must precede every step in the arrest, trial and conviction of
criminals in any community if we are to enjoy any degree of success in
the trial and punishment of criminals. The public is tired of technicalities
and loopholes in the administration of the law which permit delays in trials
and appeals. The bench and bar are responsible for this. Speedier trials
and determination of appeals should be the purpose of this group.
I feel that the substantive criminal statutes of Indiana are ample, except
in rare instances, to define every crime, but our code of procedure is in
need of some improvement. The Code of Criminal Procedure, as suggested
by the American Law Institute, offers numerous very fine suggestions of
worth-while changes applicable to the Indiana situation.
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I offer my testimonial to the meticulous care given by those experts in the
field of criminal law who have done this work. But I adopt the recommendation of a committee of the American Bar Association that each state must
consider carefully the advisability of the adoption of any new provision.
Indiana could not adopt the new code in its entirety, first, because it would
not be practicable to make such a change, and secondly, the Bar Association
itself or the lawyers of the state might not be in agreement with such a
program. Some offered suggestions would definitely be undesirable. If
the Bar Association and lawyers of Indiana could not agree, certainly the
Legislature could not, and the same result would follow such an attempt
as has followed the efforts to adopt some form of the Statutory Judicial
Council, namely failure. So it is vital, I think, that the members of the
bar itself be sold upon some changes that we may regard as vital and urgent
at the moment. We must remember that unless we can influence the lawyer
members of the State Legislature, and particularly the Judiciary Committees,
there is very little possibility of accomplishing any results. History of
uniform legislation in all the states show that uniformity in criminal laws
work slower than in any other field of the law. This is explained in some
states by the influence of the criminal lawyer in the State Legislature.
I cannot recount all of the fine improvements in the field of criminal law,
which the Bar Association has accomplished in recent years, but I pause to
pay tribute to the fine service of the committees who have been arduously
working on this subject. I just mention a provision in the 1929 law requiring the defendant's attorney to state what he expects to prove at the close
of the prosecutor's statement, and before the introduction of any evidence,
as a step in reformed procedure that proved very important to Prosecutor
Herbert Wilson, of Marion County, in the trial- of one Hamilton for the
murder of one Jackson. When Hamilton's attorney announced an alibi in
his opening statement, which was the first intimation of Hamilton's defense,
Mr. Wilson immediately dispatched an investigator to Kansas for evidence,
which was introduced at the eleventh hour of the trial, and proved very
vital in the conviction of the defendant. Kansas is some distance from
Indianapolis and, except for quick action on the part of Prosecutor Wilson,
the evidence could not have been procured. Had the alibi been announced
at the close of the state's evidence, it would have been too late for the
prosecutor to have rebutted it.
But Michigan and Ohio have done even better with their notice of alibi
statutes, which have been the subject of debate in this association, and which
law came forcibly to my attention in the trials at Lima, Ohio, of Harry
Pierpont, Charles Makley and Russell Clark, members of the Dillinger gang,
for the murder of Jess Sarber, the Lima sheriff. The Ohio law requires
a notice of three days before the trial, specific information of the place where
the defendant was at the time of the alleged crime. Michigan requires a
four days' notice, which is even better. Congress has just passed a similar
law, upon recommendation of Attorney General Cummings, which has
recently been signed by the President. The Federal law does not seem to
me, however, to accomplish the full purpose, as it provides upon the failure
of the defendant to furnish notice of the alibi before or at the time of the
trial, the government may have a postponement of the trial. I believe the
statute should provide that upon failure of the defendant to furnish the
required statutory notice, the court should have the discretionary right to
exclude the offered evidence.
I had an opportunity in the trials of Pierpont, Makley and Clark to observe
the advantages given the prosecuting attorney to rebut the testimony of their
alibis. Clark, for example, claimed to be present at his brother's birthday
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party in Detroit. Investigation in advance of the trial and testimony during
trial proved that the brother who had a birthday was not even at his birthday
party, and the alibi, supported principally by a brother-in-law of Clark,
developed into an exposure of the brother-in-law as one who was probably
implicated in the gang and who furnished transportation to the gang whenever it was needed.
The alibi law was a great aid to the prosecuting attorney at Lima in proving the alibis of Pierpont, Makley and Clark were false and in securing their
conviction for murder, Pierpont and Makley receiving sentences of death
and Clark a sentence of life imprisonment.
The criminal element knows of the alibi law of Michigan and Ohio, and
I am informed the law has reduced considerably the common practice of
perjury. Several perjury convictions have been obtained, especially in
Detroit, and from my investigations, the law meets with favor on the part
of enforcement officers. A sample of this is how the law worked in the
case of Hymie Martin, a gangster, arrested in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania,
for a Cleveland, Ohio, murder. Old Man Habeas Corpus went to his rescue
in Pittsburgh and all his friends rallied. Hymie could not have committed
the murder in Cleveland, they said, because Hymie was in Pittsburgh and
he could not be in Pittsburgh and Cleveland at one and the same time. The
Pittsburgh judge thought a Cleveland jury should pass upon his guilt or
innocence and so held. He was extradited, and when Hymie served notice
of his alibi, strange to say, he stated that he was in Akron, Ohio, at the time
of the murder and not in Pittsburgh at all.
Several states, notably New York and California, though ably sponsored
by bar associations, the attorneys general of the states, and leading jurists,
lawyers and publicists of the states, have failed to secure passage of the
law through the State Legislatures. The passage by Congress, however, of
the alibi law and the general movement for stricter rules of procedure, for
law enforcement will bring this new law to the attention of forty-two states,
which meet in 1935. I believe Indiana is ripe for this reform in the law.
I personally feel that there would be some objection in Indiana to some
of the offered reforms of the American Law Institute. Indiana people are
jealous of their liberties. I am afraid they would not approve of the right
of the court to comment upon the facts in a criminal case. Indiana is
politically minded more so than many states and I find that lawyers disapprove of this power of the court because of the likelihood of abuse. Our
courts who have tried to make speeches from the bench are usually rebuked.
I also find a serious objection to the provision relating to the joint trial of
felony offenders.
I believe every one will approve the proposal to secure the attendance of
witnesses from without the state in criminal cases. Congress has passed and
the President on June 16, 1934, signed the act, which gives the consent of
Congress in advance to two or more states to pass laws to make effective
agreements of states to enforce criminal laws and policies, and to establish
an agency or agencies of the agreeing states to enforce their criminal laws.
Already work has begun by a committee of fourteen states of which I am
chairman to make this law effective in so far as it relates to parole violators.
Another provision meeting popular favor relates to uniform laws on extradition, and another is that making ownership of a machine gun without license
a felony.
I believe the state should be allowed to pay witness fees to non-residents
of the county, and to force their attendance. I believe the state should be
permitted to pay expert witnesses for their testimony. I believe the state
should have the same opportunity to produce evidence, expert and otherwise,

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

that a wealthy or influential defendant possesses. There should be a parity
in bank embezzlement cases, the prosecutor should be provided with accountants and appraisement experts; in murder cases with special investigators
and ballistic experts; in bank robbery and burglary cases, investigators and
fingerprint experts.
I saw the practical operation of the recommendations of the American
Law Institute in the Pierpont, Makley and Clark trials, as they related to
the simplified indictment, the provision for the alternate juror and the right
of the prosecutor to comment to the jury upon the failure of the defendant
to testify. The reaction of the bench and bar was favorable and these
reforms should have the earnest thought of the bar.
Another reform which in my opinion would be very advantageous has to
do with the determination of constitutional questions. The procedure under
our Declaratory Judgment Act now takes so much time that we lose most
of the advantage of the act. It is practically impossible to get a decision
on a constitutional question short of 90 to 120 days even with all parties
co-operating. Some method should be evolved for getting a speedy decision
on such questions: To my mind the simplest method would be to provide
that the Attorney General, as the chief enforcement officer, should be notified
of the filing of every action where a constitutional question is involved and
that he then, might in his discretion remove that question directly to the
Supreme Court for decision. With that change in procedure, we should be
able to get those questions decided in not more than thirty days after the
filing of the original action and the delays and uncertainties incident to such
delay would be avoided.
I could not, as Attorney General of Indiana, appear upon this occasion
without making reference to what I believe is a serious omission in the
statute law relating to the duties and powers of the Attorney General. At
common law, the Attorney General represented the interests of the people
of the state. I was amazed to find upon assuming the functions of my office
the total lack of authority of the Attorney General to enforce the criminal
laws of the 0state, upon the failure, refusal or neglect of the prosecuting
attorney to function. The Attorney General is generally regarded as the
chief enforcement officer of the state, yet in very rare cases can he assume
the power to proceed in his own right, under authority of the statute, from
which he must get his power. This authority was given him under the
Wright Bone Dry law, and where a prosecuting attorney failed, neglected
or refused to enforce the law, the Attorney General could assume the
authority to proceed in his own special right. Not so, under the Alcoholic
Beverage Control Act of 1933. There are instances in Indiana where prosecuting attorneys will not prosecute violations of the law. In this complex
society with its broad ramifications of political control, local enforcement
officers fail in their duty and I feel if the Legislature desires to make a
progressive step in law enforcement the Attorney General should be given
broad powers to supervise the work of local prosecuting attorneys. With
the power available, it would be used very rarely.
I could discuss many laws which would improve our code of procedure,
but I do not have.the allotted time. The Indiana Legislature in 1931 and
1933 had before it three meritorious bills which failed of passage because
of the failure of this Association to present a united front, and its failure to
mould a sentiment among laymen of their necessity. I refer to Senate Bill
120, introduced by Senator Rawley in 1931, relating to legal procedure and
conferring upon the Supreme Court of Indiana power to make, prescribe
and enforce rules and regulations in regard thereto; also Senate Bill 158,
introduced by Senator Sands in the 1933 Legislature, simplifying rules of
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procedure in appellate practice; also Senate Bill No. 122, intfoduced by
Senators Kehoe, Wade and Ketcham, conferring powers upon the Supreme
Court to make, prescribe, enforce and promulgate rules of procedure. This
last bill would give to the Supreme Court the power to make rules without
any further legislative juggling. The failure of the Legislature to take this
advance step may probably have the'support of a considerable number who
are present here tonight. I can appreciate how men who have practiced
law a lifetime and through hard effort and strain have mastered the rules
of procedure are loath to sanction any change, and yet that is one of the
indictments against the legal profession, that it is slow to join the march
of progress. Attorney General Cummings accomplished in a brief few
months in the matter of procedure what a generation of lawyers had espoused
but had never accomplished, namely, the passage of a bill through Congress,
approved by the President, June 19, 1934, which authorized the Supreme
Court of the United States to prescribe uniform rules of practice and procedure for the Federal courts in actions at law. It replaced a patchwork of
statutes and decisions which are designed to bring about a uniform system
of procedure in Federal and state courts throughout the country, described
by President Roosevelt as "a simplified, flexible, scientific, correlated system
of procedural rules." This law has been described by Attorney General
Cummings as "one of the most sweeping" legal reforms in the history of the
United States." The movement for this reform began in 1909. It has
merit as shown by the success attained by a similar provision under the
English Judicature Act, and the approval given it by the bench and bar of
America. The American Bar Association approved and worked for its
passage for twenty-five years. The proposal-was approved by Presidents
Wilson, Taft and Coolidge, and by Attorneys General McReynolds, Gregory,
Palmer and Stone, and by former Senator Sutherland, now a member of
the United States Supreme Court. All of them urged Congress to act.
National organizations of various interest, including forty-six state bar
associations, indorsed the movement. The Attorney General, obtaining the
endorsement of President Roosevelt, secured the passage and he has accomplished by one law reforms in procedure that may outweigh in importance
anything accomplished by the last session of Congress.
Indiana may well follow in the footsteps of these daring leaders and give
us a law of procedure, vesting authority for rules of procedure in criminal
cases in the Indiana Supreme Court, that will serve as a challenge to
racketeers, kidnapers, gangsters, bank robbers and murderers, to come to
Indiana and see us sometime.
Chairman Robinson introduced Mr. James M. Ogden, of Indianapolis,
who read the report of the Committee on Criminal Jurisprudence, which
by vote of the Association was referred to the Board of Managers for such
action as they might determine desirable.
REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JURISPRUDENCE
The origin of this committee was by a resolution passed at the annual
meeting of the Association at Michigan City on July 10, 1926. It originated
as a special committee, not being provided for by the constitution or by-laws
of the Association. The committee appointed by the resolution was a committee to draft a revision of the Criminal Code of Indiana or propose amendments thereto, the same to be submitted to the membership and if approved
to be presented to the General Assembly for enactment.
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The committee, with a changing personnel, has continued from year to
year. No member of the present committee has served on this committee
during any prior year. Some of the recommendations of the committee
have been enacted into law.
The committee at this time desires to make certain recommendations.
There being no session of the General Assembly during the term of the
present committee, we had no duties to perform pertaining to legislative
functions in conjunction with the Committee on Legislation.
Now, as the first recommendation is concerning this Code of Criminal
Procedure, which has been presented to you, I want to assure you that only
about 170 pages of it are actually the code; the rest are annotations. About
one-fifth of that volume that has been presented to you is actually the code
that has been talked about so much this evening.
First: The committee approves the idea and plan of the Code of Criminal
Procedure of the American Law Institute and recommends that in order to
carry out the plan of the American Bar Association, the Committee on
Criminal Jurisprudence, as appointed by the incoming president of this
Association, be instructed to make a detailed examination of the code, and
to advocate and support proposed statutes or to advocate and support court
rules, if that is possible, incorporating such 'portions of the code as are
desirable in Indiana.
Second: The committee recommends that the following acts drafted and
adopted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws and approved by the American Bar Association be submitted to and
urged for passage by the General Assembly of Indiana:
1.
state
2.
3.

Uniform act to secure the attendance of witnesses from without the
in criminal cases.
Uniform criminal extradition act.
Uniform machine gun act.

We wish to report that President Seebirt submitted to this committee the
questionnaire on Criminal Law and Its Enforcement, a part of the National
Bar Program. Each member of the committee answered the questionnaire
and a composite answer was forwarded to the headquarters of the American
Bar Association.

FRIDAY MORNING
July 13, 1934
The meeting convened at 10 o'clock with President Seebirt in the chair.
The Association voted on a motion by Mr. Batchelor of Indianapolis to
direct the Board of Managers to consider the matter of a general statutory
revision for the State of Indiana, and to report its conclusions to the midwinter meeting.
President Seebirt introduced the Honorable Fred Hines, Judge of the
Hamilton Circuit Court and President of the Indiana Judicial Council, who
assumed the duties of the chair for the morning session. Judge Hines introduced the Honorable Milton S. Hastings, Judge of the Forty-ninth Judicial
Circuit; the Honorable Albert B. Chipman, Judge of the Marshall Circuit
Court, and the Honorable Maurice E. Crites, Judge of the Lake Superior
Court, each of whom delivered a prepared address upon the Work of the
Trial Courts. These addresses will be published in full in the November
issue of the Indiana Law Journal and, together with the address of Justice

STATE BAR ASSOCIATION PROCEEDINGS

William W. Potter of the Supreme Court of Michigan, will constitute a
symposium on the Work of the Courts.
After the addresses by Judges Hastings, Chipman, and Crites, the Association voted that the matter of selection of judges in the State of Indiana be
referred to a special committee for study and report at the next meeting of
the Association.
The meeting adjourned at 11:45 a. m.

FRIDAY AFTERNOON
July 13, 1934
The meeting convened at 2:10 o'clock, President Seebirt in the chair.
The report of the Auditing Committee was made by Mr. Wade H. Free
and adopted by the Association.

REPORT OF THE AUDITING COMMITTEE
Your Auditing Committee has examined the report of the SecretaryTreasurer for the year ending June 30, 1934. In making this examination
your committee has examined the original record showing all receipts and
disbursements. We find that the balance now on hand is six hundred six
dollars and sixty-five cents ($606.65), as shown by said report, which balance
is deposited in the Indiana National Bank of Indianapolis, Indiana, in the
name of said Association.
We also find that the books of the said Secretary-Treasurer are correct,
and we recommend the approval of the Treasurer's report.

On motion by Mr. John Randolph of Lafayette, the following article was
adopted as a part of the by-laws of the Association:

ARTICLE 22, BY-LAWS, INDIANA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION
ARTICLE 22-JOINT COUNCIL ON LEGAL EDUCATION:

The Indiana State Bar Association shall have a committee known as the
Joint Council on Legal Education; this committee shall consist of the deans
of the approved law schools of the State of Indiana and the Committee on
Legal Education of this Association. The President of this Association
shall be ex-officio a member of said committee and the chairman thereof.
Said committee shall at the call of the chairman meet with the members
of the Supreme Court and the Board of Bar Examiners and discuss legal
education and standards and requirements thereof for admission to the bar.
This committee may in its discretion make recommendations from time
to time to the Supreme Court on educational standards and requirements
for admission to the bar.
Mr. Samuel Offutt read a report of the Committee on an Amendment to
the Bankruptcy Act, which was accepted and placed on file by the Association.
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REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON AMENDMENT OF
BANKRUPTCY ACT
At the mid-winter meeting, Frank C. Olive, Esq., member of the Committee on Commercial Law and Bankruptcy, American Bar Association, and
a member of this Association, reported upon the discussion of the proposed
amendments to the Bankruptcy Act.
In his report, Mr. Olive made the following statements:
"The extreme conditions of economic depression and the change of
administrations combined to make the Seventy-third Congress conscious of
the necessity of immediate relief to debtors, and the administration program
took the form partly of a five-point bankruptcy program for the relief of
debtors. Of the five points, three were enacted into laws at the last session
of Congress:
"First, the provision for the relief of debtors; second, agricultural compositions and extensions; third, reorganization of railroads engaged in
interstate commerce.
"The fourth point in the bankruptcy program is that of general corporate
reorganization. This measure failed of passage in the Seventy-second Congress and was re-introduced in various forms in the Seventy-third Congress.
"The fifth bankruptcy point in the administration's program represents
an attempt to relieve cities and other taxable districts from their present
bonded and other indebtedness through the device of a bankruptcy proceeding in the United States courts entitled, 'Municipal Debt Readjustments.'
"A very serious situation exists with reference to defaults of municipalities
and other governmental instrumentalities. As of November 14, 1933, 300
counties, 574 cities and towns, 270 school districts, and 60 other taxing
districts, making a grand total of 1,532 of all classes, had defaulted in the
payment of their obligations, and the State of Arkansas was also in default
in payment of its obligations. Florida, North Carolina and Ohio led in
the number of such defaulting districts. A tremendous agitation has been
carried on with a view to the passage of this bill, and it would not be at all
surprising to see such a measure passed in the present session of Congress.
The American Bar Association has taken a firm stand against the passage
of any such legislation.

*

*

*

"It is expected that the present Congress will take some action on both
the corporate reorganization and municipal bankruptcy questions."
That, gentlemen, was the situation at the mid-winter meeting of this bar.
That is, in the development of the recovery program; as a part of that
recovery, it was proposed that municipalities who had defaulted on their
debt, could go through the bankruptcy court, and by an adjustment relieve
themselves of the circumstances by having some of that debt released, and
the other proposition was that corporations, instead of going through bankruptcy and liquidating their assets, should have the right to go through the
bankruptcy court, and readjust their affairs under the court's order, and
going on without closing up their business.
The Seventy-third Congress passed the "Municipal Debt Readjustments"
legislation and legislation providing for corporate reorganization, both, as
amendments to the National Bankruptcy Act.
The bill providing for municipal debt readjustments was approved May 24,
1934, and that providing for corporate reorganization was approved June 7,
1934, and a slight amendment thereof was approved June 18, 1934.
The public press, at the time of the passage of the municipal debt readjustments legislation, stated that both Senators of Indiana voted against the bill.
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The municipal debt readjustments amendment, after a declaration of
policy, to-wit, "a national emergency caused by increasing financial difficulties
of many local government units, which renders imperative the further exercise of the bankruptcy powers of the Congress of the United States," provides that:
"Until the expiration of two years from the date this chapter takes effect,
in addition to the jurisdiction exercised in voluntary and involuntary proceedings to adjudge persons bankrupt, courts of bankruptcy shall exercise
'original jurisdiction in proceedings for the relief of debtors, as provided in
this chapter of this act." (Chapter 9, Section 79.)
That any municipality, or other political subdivision of any state, including
the several units particularly named in the act, may file a petition stating
that the taxing district is insolvent or unable to meet its debts as they mature
and that it desires to effect a plan of readjustient of its debts, with the
court in whose territorial jurisdiction the taxing district or the major part
thereof is located, and shall state that a plan of readjustment has been prepared, is filed and submitted with the petition and that creditors of the taxing
district owning certain percentages in amount of bonds, notes and certificates
of indebtedness, of the taxing district affected by the plan, excluding certain
obligations, held or controlled by the taxing district, have accepted it in
writing.
By the terms of the act, a plan of readjustment within the meaning thereof
"shall include provisions modifying or altering the rights of creditors generally or of any class of them, secured or unsecured, either through the
issuance of new securities of any character or otherwise; and may contain
such other provisions and agreements not inconsistent with this -chapter, as
the parties may desire."
Upon confirmation, the provisions of the plan and of the order of confirmation are declared to be binding upon
(1) The taxing district, and
(2) All creditors, secured or unsecured, whether or not affected by the
plan and whether or not their claims shall have been filed or evidenced, and
if filed, or evidenced, whether or not allowed, including creditors who have
not, as well as those who have, accepted.
The brief statement of the provisions of the act heretofore made are not,
and are not intended to be, exhaustive nor to state all of the provisions of
the act. The procedure is detailed and any one interested in legal proceedings
to effect the provisions of the act should familiarize himself with the
numerous provisions of the act by a careful perusal thereof.
In a general way, this amendment to the bankruptcy law provides that
in the bankruptcy court, not in our state courts or ordinary Federal courts,
but any municipality which has defaulted on its bonds or is insolvent or not
prepared to meet its obligations, can go into court and with the consent of a
certain percentage of its creditors can scale down and pay what the creditors
and court think should be paid, and the other creditors are bound by the
provision.
Now, what percentage of creditors has to be secured, I don't know. I
talked with one gentleman. He thought it was two-thirds. In the corporate
act it is two-thirds, but anyhow, it makes this situation, that a governmental
unit who has promised and made a contract with creditors to pay bonds can,
with the consent of the court and a majority of those creditors, refuse to
pay those obligations. This has been fought by the American Bar Association, but was passed anyhow.
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Business Week (June 16, 1934), reporting the passage of the corporation
bankruptcy bill, said, it was passed "primarily to prevent small minorities
from levying tribute before permitting reorganization of distressed companies."
Also, "Corporations have just been added to the list of debtor classes
benefiting from the changes in the National Bankruptcy Law. Section 77b,
approved by the President last week, extends to corporations the same
rights that were earlier accorded to municipalities, railroads, farms, individuals. This broad program was started by Congress during the Hoover.
administration. The first bill, passed March 1, 1933, and applying mainly
to railroads, originally included a clause covering general corporations, but
this was eliminated in the Senate.
"The basic idea behind all the amendments is to allow debtors in difficulty
to scale down their debts with the consent of a specified majority of their
creditors and the approval of the Federal Court. Striking minorities are
prevented from blocking a reorganization, but the law provides for a court
hearing of small claims to prevent injustices. The new Corporate Bankruptcy Law permits a petition of reorganization to be filed by any creditor
or stockholder providing it is approved by holders of 25 per cent in amount
of each class of claims and 10 per cent of the whole. A plan consented to
by the court and agreed to by two-thirds of the total claims becomes binding
upon all creditors."
In a subsequent issue of Business Week (June 23, 1934), under the
general topic, "What Congress Did: To and For Business," and under the
sub-heading "Bankruptcy Relief" (pages 14 and 15), the purpose and
method were stated as follows:
"To ease debt deflation and prevent minority of bankrupt's creditors from
blocking reasonable adjustment.
"By permitting corporate reorganization on approval of two-thirds of the
creditors and the courts.
"By providing that during emergency period of two years, local governmental taxing units may ask Federal Courts for approval of readjustment
plans acceptable to specified majorities of creditors."
In March, 1932, then, President Hoover proposed corporate reorganization
through revision of the National Bankruptcy Act. At that time, committees
of the departments of Justice and of Commerce, headed by the then Solicitor
General Thatcher, presented a voluminous report on the revision of the
Bankruptcy Act, but the entire matter remained unacted upon, until near the
end of that year. Early in 1933, President Hoover in a special message,
urged its consideration as an emergency measure and a few days before
Congress adjourned, a measure was passed giving relief to individual debtors,
but Congress then declined to extend this relief to corporations, upon the
ground that time did not afford opportunity for proper consideration.
The new amendatory act adds two sections to the Bankruptcy Act to be
known as 77A and 77B, and also amends Sections 74, 63, 67, 77, 75 and 76
of the existing act. The new Section, 77A, simply provides that in addition
to the jurisdiction exercised in voluntary and involuntary bankruptcy proceedings, the courts also may exercise original jurisdiction in proceedings for
relief of corporate debtors as provided in the new Section 77B.
This new Section is divided into sixteen subdivisions, identified by letters
a to p, inclusive, and contains a complete scheme for corporate reorganization under court supervision and with court approval, either in cases wheie
there is actual insolvency or where the corporation is temporarily unable to
meet maturing obligations. Any corporation which could become a bankrupt under the existing act, or any railroad or other transportation company,
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except those authorized under the existing railroad reorganization provisions
to file petitions, may avail themselves of the provisions of this section. This
seems to extend the benefits of the act to all capital shares corporations
except those engaged in insurance and banking.
Petitions may be filed either by the corporation or by three or more
creditors having provable unsecured claims amounting to $1,000 or more,
in the bankruptcy court having jurisdiction in the territory in which the
corporation either was organized, where it has its principal place of business
or where its principal assets are located, and may be filed either before or
after adjudication in bankruptcy. If the court is satisfied of the good faith
of the petitioner an order of approval may be made. If such an order is
entered an order of adjudication in bankruptcy shall not be entered, and the
court shall have exclusive jurisdiction of the debtor and its property wherever
located. The corporation shall be referred to in the proceedings as a
"debtor," thus removing any stigma that might be attached to the appellation
"bankrupt."
"The plan of reorganization within the meaning of this Section:
(1) shall include provisions modifying or altering the rights of creditors
*

generally;

*

*

(2) may include provisions modifying or altering the rights of stockholders generally; * * *
(3) shall provide for the payment in cash of all costs of administration
and other allowances;

*

*

*

(4) shall provide in respect of each class of stockholders, of which less
than a majority shall accept such plan (unless the judge shall determine
either that the debtor is insolvent, or that the interest of such class of stockholders will not be affected adversely by the plan), adequate protection for
the realization by them of the value of their equity, if any; * * *
(5) shall provide in respect of each class of creditors of which less than
two-thirds in amount shall accept such plan (unless the claims of such class
of creditors will not be affected by the plan, or the plan makes provision for
the payment of their claims in cash in full), provide adequate protection for
the realization by them of the value of their interests, claims, or liens; * * *
(6) may reject contracts of the debtor which are executory in whole or
in part; * * *
(7) shall, in case any creditor or stockholder or class thereof shall not
be affected by the plan, specify the creditor or stockholder or class or classes
thereof not affected; * * *
(8) shall specify what claims, if any, are to be paid in cash in full; * * *
(9) shall provide adequate means for the execution of the plan; * * *
(10) may deal with all or any part of the property of the debtor and may
include any other appropriate provisions not inconsistent with this section.

*

*

*'

"The court may continue the debtor corporation in possession or may
appoint trustees pending the consideration of the reorganization plan which
shall not be confirmed until accepted by creditors holding two-thirds in
amount of each class of claims affected and by shareholders holding a majority of the shares of each class. Upon confirmation by the court, the plan shall
be binding upon the debtor, all shareholders and all creditors, whether secured
or unsecured and whether they have formally accepted the plan or not."
The corporation reorganization act is discussed at length and in a very
comprehensive and satisfactory manner by David Lawrence in The United
States News issue of June 11, 1934, to which those particularly interested
are referred.
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A drafting committee consisting of representatives from the National
Association of Referees in Bankruptcy, the Commercial Law League of
America, the National Association of Credit Men, the Federal Bar Association of New York, New Jersey and Connecticut, the Law School of Harvard
University and the committee on Commercial Law and Bankruptcy of the
American Bar Association is preparing a fourth tentative draft of a proposed
act to establish a uniform system of bankruptcy throughout the United
States to amend or replace the present National Bankruptcy Act.
In a letter received from Mr. Frank C. Olive, a member of the drafting
committee hereinbefore mentioned, representing the Committee on Commercial Law and Bankruptcy of the American Bar Association, Mr. Olive
says:
"It was intended that after the fourth tentative draft is submitted to the
various groups, each group will consider the draft by itself and probably
those portions of suggested amendments that can be agreed upon by all of
the various groups will be embodied in a draft to be submitted to Congress,
the passage of which can be recommended unanimously.
"It is, as you will observe, almost an endless job and the work of the
conference group, whose purpose originally was merely to make certain
important amendments to the act which would have the effect of expediting
administration and overcoming the effect of a few court decisions, has
developed into an attempt to restate the whole Bankruptcy Act."
It is evident, therefore, for the reasons stated by Mr. Olive, above referred to, the amendment of the Bankruptcy Act and the time and character
of amendments, if any, is necessarily indefinite.

Mr. Louden L. Bomberger of Hammond read the report of the Committee
on Reorganization of the Bar, which on vote of the Association was adopted
and the recommendations referred to the Board of Managers.
REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON REORGANIZATION OF THE BAR
The members of the Association are familiar with the proposed bill for
integration of the bar that was submitted and sponsored by the Association
at the 1933 session of the Generaly Assembly. They also know that this
bill was defeated on the floor of the House of Representatives, after having
been favorably reported by unanimous vote of the committee to which it
had been referred. The apparent reasons for the defeat of this proposed
measure were brought to you in the President's annual address, and in the
report of this Committee, at the 1933 meeting.
While no legislative action can be sought nor promoted, until the session
of 1935, your Committee has endeavored to use all opportunity to keep the
idea of an integrated bar before the lawyers of the state, and to observe the
progress of the plan in other states.
The principle of an integrated bar has acquired sufficient momentum and
disclosed such merit as to justify the assumption that sooner or later Indiana
will adopt it.
The first suggestion for integration of the bar came from The American
Judicature Society in 1914. The first state to adopt the plan was North
Dakota in 1921. Since that time it has been accepted and applied in Alabama, Arizona, California, Idaho, Kentucky, Mississippi, Nevada, New
Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Utah and
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Washington, and has been passed by the legislature of Wyoming, but vetoed
by the Governor. It is under earnest consideration in Minnesota, Ohio,
Oregon, Texas and Virginia.
Integrated bar acts divide generally into two groups: those which incorporate the bar, and those which create an administrative agency. The
length varies from a complete code, such as that of California, to a brief
measure like the Kentucky law, which puts the whole subject into the lap
of the Court of Appeals.
Indeed, the Kentucky Act is such a departure from conventional lines
that your committee is disposed to ask for its serious consideration by the
Association. It consists of three sections, the first of which directs the
Court of Appeals to adopt and promulgate such rules and regulations as
it may see proper, to define the practice of law, prescribe a code of ethics
governing the conduct of lawyers and the practice of law, establish practice
and procedure for discipline, organizing and governing a Bar Association,
and fix the schedule of fees for the purpose of administering the act, with
a maximum of $2.00 per annum. The second section provides that when
and as the rules of court shall be prescribed and adopted, all laws in conflict
therewith shall be of no further force or effect.
This act, your Committee believes, is a model of brevity and comprehensiveness. After all, it amounts to a withdrawal of the legislative branch
of the state government from the dual encroachment it has been permitted
to make upon the prerogatives of the judiciary. It is one part of a change
that must sooner or later come about, that is, both the power to promulgate
and enforce rules of practice, and the power to control the bar engaged in
conducting the business of the courts, must be taken back into the hands of
the courts. In reality, such authority may be asserted by the courts without
legislation.
This position taken by the President of the Ohio State Bar Association,
in his annual address at the meeting last July, is a notable contribution to
the literature on the subject. In October, 1933, the Supreme Court of Missouri declared its inherent power to discipline and disbar attorneys (in re
Richards, 63 SW (2) 672). Within the past month, the Missouri Court
adopted the report of the Commission which will result in the establishment
of an Integrated Bar in that state under the declared inherent power of the
Court without waiting for legislation on the subject.
A quotation from the comments of the President of the Missouri Bar
Association upon this momentous step displays its significance. He said:
"The importance of what has been accomplished lies in the fact that we
have effectuated a transfer of power from the Legislative to the Judicial
branch of government; that the Court now assumes direct responsibility for
the practice of law in this State; that the Judicial branch now fully occupies
its proper orbit of influence and becomes a truly coordinate and equal branch
of our State government. We believe that we have realized a New Deal
of our own, and that the bar of Missouri is at the dawn of its fair day."
Your Committee points with pride and unstinted approval to the record
of the Supreme Court of this state and its board of bar examiners in establishing and enforcing qualifications and rules for admission to the bar. This
important step has raised Indiana from the abject position of patronizing
ridicule on the part of many other states, to one of dignity and comparably
high standard.
The record of the Supreme Court and its board of bar examiners in dealing with admissions to the bar, leaves without argument or excuse the
critics and opponents of the proposal to place in the hands of that Court
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the responsibility for rules of practice, and the organization and control of
the bar.
Originally every plan for integration of the bar involved many elements,
and particularly a detailed outline of procedure on the subject of discipline
and admissions. Experience with these acts had led to the modification of
the best thought on the subject, which has brought forth the Kentucky Act,
and the proposal in Minnesota very similar to it. It is asserted, in other
words, that there are three fundamental objectives, to-wit: all-inclusive
organization, equal payment of dues, and equal participation in management.
Once the bar is organized along these lines, it will naturally acquire the
attributes necessary to maintain proper discipline.
In view of what is described, for convenience, as the modern trend, your
Committee respectfully submits to the Association the recommendation that
the act proposed at the 1933 session be replaced by a brief one along the
lines of the Kentucky law and the Minnesota proposal.
Such a bill will obviate one of the most effective arguments against integration, which is that too much power is placed in the hands of the bar. Akin
to it is the assertion that the legislature is prescribing too much in the way
of regulation of the profession. These arguments are not likely to be
seriously pressed against a law which proposes to put the whole matter in
the hands of the Supreme Court. This suggestion is regarded as particularly
pertinent in view of the Court's record in connection with admissions to
the bar.
Moreover, where the subject is under the control of the court, amendments
and modifications may readily be made as deemed advisable.
There is a further probable advantage in proposing a very brief enactment;
this lies in the fact that no one can be suspicious nor doubtful about a very
short measure who might, and frequently does, oppose for those reasons, a
lengthy or involved one.
There is attached hereto, and submitted as a part of this report, a proposed
draft of a bill to be submitted to the next General Assembly, substantially
copying the Kentucky law, and your Committee respectfully recommends
that this repott be received and filed, and referred to the Board of MAlanagers
for further attention.

PROPOSED
INDIANA STATE BAR ACT

An Act concerning attorneys at law and practice of law.
Section 1. Be it enacted by the General Assembly of Indiana: The
Supreme Court of Indiana shall, from time to time, adopt and promulgate
such rules and regulations as the Court may see proper:
(A) Defining the practice of law.
Prescribing a code of ethics governing the professional conduct of
(B)
attorneys at law and the practice of law.
(C) Establishing practice and procedure for disciplining, suspending,
and disbarring attorneys at law.
(D) Organizing and governing a bar association of the attorneys at law
of this state to act as an administrative agency of the Supreme Court of
Indiana for the purpose of enforcing such rules and regulations as are prescribed, adopted, and promulgated by the Supreme Court under this act,
providing for the government of the State Bar as a part of the judicial
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department of the state government, and for such divisions thereof as the
Supreme Court shall determine, and requiring all persons practicing law
in this state to be members thereof in good standing, and fixing the form
of its organization and operation.
(E) Fixing a schedule of fees to be paid for the purpose of administering this act, and rules and regulations to be prescribed, adopted, and
promulgated hereunder for the collecteion and disbursement of such fees.
Section 2. When and as the rules and regulations of Court herein authorized shall be prescribed, adopted, and promulgated, all laws or parts of laws
in conflict therewith shall be and become of no further force or effect to the
extent of such conflict.
Section 3. If any section, subdivision, sentence, or clause of this act shall
be held invalid or unconstitutional, such fact shall not affect nor impair the
validity of the remaining portions of this act.
Chairman Seebirt introduced the Honorable William W. Potter, of the
Supreme Court of Michigan, who read a prepared address. This address
will be published in full in the November issue of the Indiana Law Journal,
as a part of the symposium on The Work of the Courts.
Chairman Seebirt then read to the Association a letter from the Honorable
Earle W. Evans, President of the American Bar Association:
President Eli F. Seebirt
Indiana State Bar Association
Dear Mr. Seebirt:
Upon my return to the city, I found your letter of the sixth inst. and
was obliged to telegraph you yesterday as follows:
"Regret it much but cannot attend your meeting July thirteenth. Writing,"
which I hereby confirm.
I would so much have liked to be present at and participate in your meeting, but just cannot arrange to do so. One of the two professional matters
that I am committed to look after during this year is set for the 13th inst.,
and can not be continued or otherwise handled. In addition to that, I am
already so far behind with the discharge of insistent duties that I really
should stay home and work upon them.
I have found an ever-growing interest on the part of the lawyers of the
nation as the year has advanced in problems of the bar and of our country.
With one single exception, the meetings I have attended this year have been
larger in point of numbers present and in enthusiasm and determination
to really do something than ever before, and I do not in the least doubt
that I would, if permitted to attend it, find exactly the same situation in
Indiana.
The lawyers have been unjustly and cruelly criticized of late, indicating
that the appraisal of the public of our honesty, if not of our ability, is very,
very low. It can avail us nothing to merely recount the sacrificial services
of the members of our profession in our country's welfare, because the
public will seemingly not listen or believe us, such is the intensity of feeling
against us.
We must, therefore, find a way to make ourselves understood and our
services appreciated. We can always.find a way to do the right thing and
I know that we can, if we try, find means of rehabilitating ourselves in the
eyes of the public. The best way I can think of now of doing that is to
convince the public by actions. and not by mere resolutions that we will no
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longer tolerate in our midst lawyers who are faithless to the standards of
our profession and the cause of our country. There are, in my opinion,
relatively few of the socalled lawyer criminals in the country, but, of course,
one would be too many. It will not be so very difficult for us to get rid of
them if each of us individually will really enter whole-heartedly upon the
quest. We can do it, and in doing it, we will convince the public that we
are in earnest and place ourselves in position to become leaders in the cause
of good government. As it stands today, the people who must be aroused
in order to secure a better administration of justice are critical of the lawyers
and will not follow them. Nobody else can as well lead, and, therefore, we
must find means not only of arousing the people, but of restoring their confidence in their natural leaders.
Regretting much my inability to attend your meeting, I am, Yours very
EARLE W. EVANS.
truly,

President Seebirt introduced Dean Bernard C. Gavit of Indiana University
Law School, who made the following remarks.
DEAN BERNARD GAVIT:
Mr. President, Members of the Association:
Mr. Harper instructed me to make the following report. I think there is
no occasion for calling attention to what has been accomplished this past
year, so far as the Law Journal is concerned. They are concerned about the
plans for next year, and he wanted me to say something to you about what
they had in mind in that connection.
During the past two years, you recall that the size of the Journal has been
reduced to a considerable extent due to the fact that funds have not been
available, to maintain it upon the basis upon which it was started. The debt
of the Association has been very largely, if not entirely, paid, and it may
be that funds will be available to increase again the size of the Journal. He
says, however, he is not so concerned about that as he is in having the
Association and the Board of Managers make provision for the publishing
of an index to the Journal.
At the end of the coming year, the Journal will have published ten volumes,
and it is hoped that at the end of the year, it will be possible to publish a
complete index of- the Journal. At the present time, the index in each
volume is, as a matter of fact, rather insufficient, but he has in mind that
they will print a complete subject index, and a table of cases, and be able
to do that for something in the neighborhood of $250 or $300. So that
that will be available to the lawyers of the state next summer.
On this other matter, most of you know that in the session of 1933, the
legislature called upon the Governor to appoint a non-partisan committee
on governmental economy and efficiency, to study the cost of government in
this state, and to make recommendations as to changes which in the judgment
of the committee, after a thorough study and investigation, would be hoped
to reduce the cost of government, and at the same time to promote efficiency
in government.
That committee was appointed several months ago, and has been working
since its appointment. The Committee divided up its work, and assigned to
two members of the committee, the only two who were lawyers, the problem
of the administration of justice. Mr. Austin B. Clifford, of Indianapolis, and
myself constitute that committee.
During the past two months, with the aid of some experts whom we were
able to secure through the CWA projects, we have been making a statical
study of the administration of justice in this state, and at the present time,
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we have available a very considerable body of information upon the operation
of the court system in the State of Indiana.
Some of the results are very illuminating and, of course, at the same time
very disturbing.
It develops, for example, that some trial judges dispose of as many as
1200 cases a year; other judges dispose of from 250 to 300 cases a year.
In some instances, that is not the fault of the judge. He happens to be in
a circuit where that is all the business that is available for him. The average
number of cases disposed of by trial judges in this state is in the neighborhood of 800 cases.
We, of course, plan, when we get through, to make some recommendation
as to a reorganization of our court system, that will take care of that discrepancy, and reorganize the circuits and redistribute the judges so that
there will be something resembling an equal distribution of business, so far
as the judges of this state are concerned.
The results upon the cost of the administration of justice are illuminating,
and again show remarkable disturbances in the difference in the cost in
different counties.
The average cost of the disposition of a case in this circuit court is in the
neighborhood of $15 or $16 per case. In some counties that runs up as
high as $60 or $70. In other counties, it runs as low as $6 or $7. But the
average cost is in the neighborhood of $15 or $16. The investigation
discloses also that of the costs which are assessed, less than 20% are collected, and that if anything like a reasonable amount of the costs which are
assessed in our courts in this state were collected, the amount collected would
more than pay the present cost of administration of justice in this state,
indicating that even with our very minimum fees at this time, if we vere
committed to some method of collection of those fees, we would have money
available, not only to maintain the present system, but to improve it, and
make some additions which are obviously necessary.
Now, the thing to which Mr. Seebirt referred is this: The Committee
in conjunction with a sub-committee on penal institutions, and public welfare,
has had in mind some modification of our present system of sentencing
criminals, and of establishing what might be termed a sentencing court.
Again, the statistics indicate an altogether too -wide discrepancy and lack
of uniformity in the sentencing and dealing with criminals. The sentences
of all criminals in this state for the past two or three years have been submitted to statistical analysis, and there is absolutely no correlation whatever,
that is obtainable from a study of those sentences, indicating that, to a large
extent, the sentencing of criminals is too much within the discretion of individual judges who have, apparently, some rather peculiar notions, in
some cases, at least.
Now, that seems inevitable under a system where each judge has as
much discretion as he has at the present time as to the form of the sentence
which shall be imposed upon a criminal in a given case. The judges, despite
the admonition of the constitution, the statistics at least indicate, do not pay
any attention to the admofiition of our constitution that the sentence is for
the reformation of the criminal and not for the retribution or punishment,
and, apparently, make the crime fit the punishment, instead of the punishment to fit the crime or the criminal.
Again, illustrations show the absurd results which we get. Within the last
month, for instance, a boy in the western part of the state, who stole $1.12,
was sentenced from ten to twenty years, while a man in Indianapolis, confessed murderer of his wife and children, was sentenced one to ten years.
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The Committee has made no recommendation on this. It has simply been
discussed. It has been thought that if the trial judge tries the man, and
receives the verdict, that the question as to the nature of the punishment
which he shall receive is, after all, largely a matter for experts, that he is
entitled to some expert advice as to the social, the mental, and physical background of that individual, and so it has been suggested in keeping with what
has been done in several other states, that at least temporarily, ultimately the
trial judge may impose the sentence, but he may refer the matter to some
tribunal which shall be set up and be known as a Sentencing Court, which
shall have the power to call in to his assistance the help of psychiatrists, of
medical men, of social case workers, who know the history of the man or can
at least obtain it, and based upon that intimate knowledge of that individual,
be able to impose upon the man a sentence which will ultimately be in conformity with some general policy upon the subject, and at the same time
appear at least to be somewhat fair to the man involved.
Now, that is in keeping with a general redistribution of our administration of the penal institutions. A great deal of the difficulty in the administration of penal institutions arises out of the fact that men are sent to penal
insitutions when they don't belong there, and there must be an immense
amount of reclassification of criminals before we can hope for a very decent
administration of our penal institutions.
Now, I think it is a rather radical suggestion. Nobody has made any
very definite suggestions as to what the form of this court should be. It
would undoubtedly have to be a central court.
It seems to me to be no objection, if that ultimately proves to be a valuable
experiment, to impose that duty upon some judge in Indianapolis, for
example, or set up a separate court there in Indianapolis, not as a reviewing
body, not as an administrative body, but as a court, so that these prisoners
will be referred to that institution.
Now, the Committee and the Governor were interested in getting an
expression of opinion from this group as to what in their judgment that
program might amount to, as to whether or not the lawyers of the state
think that that is desirable or feasible.

Chairman called upon Mr. Milo N. Feightner who reported on the work
of the Board of Bar Examiners.

THE WORK OF THE BOARD OF EXAMINERS
A year ago it was my privilege to make a report to you concerning the
matter of admissions to the bar, and in the year that has elapsed we have
been able to tabulate the combined figures in what seems to us an interesting
form. Admissions to the bar in Indiana now and since the passage of the
act of July 1, 1931, are of three classes:
First: The admission on certificate, which takes care of the lawyer who
was admitted prior to July 1, 1931, and who has been bona fide in the practice
for six months. Shortly after the passage of the act a great number of
lawyers availed themselves of this and made application for admission
under it, but the number has rapidly declined and lawyers of that class are
only being admitted at the rate of a few per month. Of course, all lawyers
who were admitted to the bar of the Supreme Court prior to the passage of
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the act automatically become members of this new conception that we have of
members of the bar of Indiana.
The second class is a class admitted upon certificate of foreign license.
Due to rather rigid investigations this has been reduced to several per year,
and there is no appreciable tendency on the part of lawyers practicing in
other jurisdictions of seeking admission in Indiana, except in the case of the
bona fide lawyers of good reputation who were welcome.
The last class is the class on admission by examination, and it is a rather
interesting thing that in two and one-half years we have given 501 individual
examinations, of which 250 have passed and 251 have failed, so the average
of all those taking the examination is fixed at fifty per cent, and in this
connection a comparison with other states is enlightening.
One extreme is probably California, in which at a certain bar examination
held in August of 1933, 31 6/10% passed. The matter in California finally
reached the attention of the Court and has resulted in an order of the Court
directing that the Board show cause why the examination papers of the
unsuccessful applicants should not be re-examined. I am not at this time
apprised of the outcome of the situation in California.
The other extreme is reached in Georgia and Wyoming, where 100%
of the applicants passed the examination. From this you will see that
there is a considerable latitude. However, I call attention to the percentage
of passing in some of the representative states and as shown by the survey
and report contained in the December issue of the Bar Examiner publication
of the National Conference of Bar Examiners. You find the passing of
percentages as follows:
Illinois -------------Pennsylvania -------Minnesota -----------

49
44
39

Massachusetts ---------New York -------------

38
32

The most recent survey the country over, I am apprised, shows that the
average of those passing is 47, and one fraction per cent, so that we admit
slightly more than three per cent of the average of the country and are
liberal to that extent.
Another interesting fact is apparent as to the numbers taking the examination in Indiana as compared with other states. At the one examination in
California, which I mentioned, and at a single examination, there were a total
of 831 applicants. Our classes average fifty or sixty applicants at the fall
examination, slightly more at the March examination, and approximately
140 at the July examination. The fact that we have only given 501 examinations in two and one-half years shows that we are at least not in danger of
the great flood of applicants that are present in some states. One state, at
one examination-New York-had 1,757 applicants. Illinois at one examination in 1932 had 491 applicants; Pennsylvania, 401.
A further breakdown of our figures develops other interesting facts on
the question of repeaters. Fifty-three per cent of those taking the examination the first time pass. Twenty-five and nine-tenths per cent of those taking
the examination the second time pass. Figures on subsequent repeaters
cannot be projected yet with any degree of assurance, but I am confident
that the percentage of successful repeaters on subsequent examinations will
be downward. And it cannot be said that persistence alone will achieve admission in Indiana, which is true of some of the states.
The repeater in Indiana is theoretically eventually eliminated, but we have
not found it necessary so far to invoke this rule. And I feel confident that
when this projection can be made it will show that we will average approximately the average of the country on the repeater question.
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We have a rule by which we can refuse a third consecutive examination.
We have not very rigidly enforced that rule.
The figures which I have quoted you in Indiana do not take into consideration those making application who are not permitted to take the examination because of character; nor have I made mention of those who are not
granted admission on foreign license because of unsatisfactory fitness and
character, of whom we have had our share. I can only say that the Board
feels this responsibility, and we are guarding to the best of our ability this
phase of the question, as well as the conduct of the examination on a high
plane, requiring a standard of knowledge of law commensurate with the
requirements of those states where admission is by examination.

The Nominating Committee made its report through Mr. Frank H. Hatfield, of Evansville. After a waiver, by consent, of the constitutional requirement of a vote by ballot, the Association elected as officers of the
Association the nominees named in the report of the Nominating Committee,
which were as follows:
President-Wilmer T. Fox, Jeffersonville.
Vice-President-Fred C. Gause, Indianapolis.
Members of the Board of Managers:
First District-John A. Gavit, Hammond.
Second District-Benjamin F. Long, Logansport.
Third District-Ben Rees, LaPorte.
Fourth District-James R. Newkirk, Fort Wayne.
Fifth District-Albert H. Cole, Peru.
Sixth District-A. J. Stevenson, Danville.
Seventh District-John S. Hastings, Washington.
Eighth District-Benjamin F. Buente, Evansville.
Ninth District-Charles A. Lowe, Lawrenceburg.
Tenth District-George L. Tremain, Greensburg.
Eleventh District-Wade H. Free, Anderson.
Twelfth District-James W. Fesler, Indianapolis.
Member at Large-Ex-officio-Eli F. Seebirt, South Bend.
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REPORT OF THE NECROLOGY COMMITTEE
Death is to the earth earthy-the entrance to the High Gate of Eternity.
To the lawyer who has served with fidelity his oath of office, it is memory's page of civic righteousness.
There have passed since last we met, notable members of the legal profession in Indiana.
Ira C. Batman, Bloomington
Charles P. Bock, Evansville
John A. Bonham, Hartford City
William V. Booker, Terre Haute
Charles W. Brown, Auburn
Noble C. Butler, Indianapolis
Fred P. Byers, Kokomo
Clifton R. Cameron, Michigan City
Silas A. Canada, Winchester
William F. Carmack, Terre Haute
Michael J. Clancy, Elwood
Carl J. Colemeyer, Columbus
George A. Custer
Robert Dalton, Indianapolis
Don Douglass, Logansport
0. S. Douglass, Covington
Sydney Eder, South Bend
George W. Flick, Fort Wayne
Edward A. Ford, Indianapolis
George D. Forkner, Newcastle
James W. Fortune, Jeffersonville
John D. Furgeson, Chicago (Jeffersonville)
George A. Gamble, Logansport
E. S. Griffin, Elwood
John Hanna, Delphi
Mrs. Jennie M. Harrington
Guthrie Harrison, Newfort
Harvey W. Hartley, Peru
Silas A. Hays, Greencastle
Evan W. Heath, Covington
H. M. Seymour Home, South Bend
John Eugene Iglehart, Evansville
Harold Kelley, Bedford

James Kilroy, Poseyville
Lewis E. Kimberlin, Anderson
Austin W. Knight, Evansville
Martin L. Koons, Newcastle
Elmer Leonard, Fort Wayne
Mrs. Nina Lindly Marshall, Kokomo
William C. Mason, Rockport
Orville W. McGinnis, Evansville
Willis C. Nusbaum, indianapolis
Charles J. Orbison, formerly of
Indianapolis
L. J. Patty, Carmel
Worth W. Pepple, Michigan City
Oscar H. Powell, Indianapolis
J. Cooper Props, Muncie
A. W. Richmond, Lafayette and
Attica
Irvin H. Rosenthal
Milton Sayler, Huntington
Honorable Clyde Siever
Theodore E. Slinkard, Bloomfield
John F. Snow, Decatur
Ralph Hill Spaugh, Columbus
Mark Storen, Scottsburg
Ralph D. Thresher, Indianapolis
John A. Tindall, Shelbyville
John Underwood, Hammond
LeRoy M. Wade; Chicago (Mt.
Vernon)
Harry B. Whetsel, Clinton
Newton Yeager, Augusta, Kans.
(Kosciusko County)
Guy R. York, Peru

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

LIST OF NEW MEMBERS OF INDIANA STATE BAR
ASSOCIATION
REGULAR MEMBERS
Alfred H. Highland
Hammond, Indiana
Morrison A. Rockhill
Warsaw, Indiana
Oliver Starr
Gary, Indiana
Donald Vanderveer
Warsaw, Indiana
Jay E. Darlington
Hammond, Indiana
Edwin H. Friedrich
Hammond, Indiana
William E. Treadway
Spencer, Indiana
Floyd J. Mattice
Indianapolis, Indiana
Frank E. Stoessel
Greencastle, Indiana
George W. Deamer
Rochester, Indiana

JUNIOR MEMBERS
Lyman H. Cloe
Noblesville, Indiana
Ward E. Bonnell
Indianapolis, Indiana
Thomas A. Canhon,
Muncie, Indiana
John J. Chrisman
Connersville, Indiana
Malcolm M. Edwards,
Newcastle, Indiana
Stanley S. Gilbert
South Bend, Indiana
Frederick G. Jeffrey,
Indianapolis, Indiana

David P. Heaton
Fort Wayne, Indiana
Julius V. Medias
Indianapolis, Indiana
George L. Pepple
Goshen, Indiana
Arthur C. Nordhoff
Jasper, Indiana
Owen Voigt
Jeffersonville, Indiana
Fred W. Campbell
Frankfort,*Indiana
Irving Garnitz
South Bend, Indiana
Arthur K. Group
Indianapolis, Indiana
Walter N. Haney
Crawfordsville, Indiana
Joseph M. Howard
Indianapolis, Indiana
Francis M. Hughes
Indianapolis, Indiana
Richard LaGrange
Franklin, Indiana
Joe W. Lowdermilk
Sullivan, Indiana
E. E. MacGrogan
Indianapolis, Indiana
J. C. McCurdy
Indianapolis, Indiana
Thomas Prall
Indianapolis, Indiana
Fred H. Thoms
Terre Haute, Indiana
Joseph C. Wallace
Indianapolis, Indiana
Alfred Hollander
Indianapolis, Indiana
Czerna C. Lafler
Ft. Beni. Harrison, Indiana

J. Allen Lampman
La Porte, Indiana
Edward L. Lay
Michigan City, Indiana
Clyde A. McCoy
Fort Wayne, Indiana
Paul Mendenhall
Indianapolis, Indiana
George H. Oswalt
Brazil, Indiana
Mrs. Ruth (Delp) Owens
Clinton, indiana
John C. Shively
South Bend, Indiana
Eric Sonnich
Indianapolis, Indiana
Wilfrid de St. Aulein,
Hammond, Indiana
Harold C. Watson
Indianapolis, Indiana
R. E. Wiser,
Gary, Indiana
Claude E. York
Hammond, Indiana

STUDENT MEMBERS
Fred G. Hitchcock
Bloomington, Indiana
J. Paul Hunt
LaPorte, Indiana
Kenneth J. Luckett
English, Indiana
Robert J. Brauns
Bloomington, Indiana
Edward C. Filipiak
Bloomington, Indiana
Garfield Rogers
Madison, Indiana

